The aim of this paper is to make a comparison between the legal status of religiously affiliated schools in America and those in Italy, taking into account the difference between the two legal systems in which these institutions operate, and the different understanding of Church-State relations (separatism in the USA, Church-State Agreements in Italy). First, the study examines the different juridical legal structures offered by the two legal systems to religious organisations to manage secular works and protect their property. Secondly it examines the problem of the access of religiously affiliated schools to the public funding necessary for these institutions to continue to develop their mission: in both legal systems religiously affiliated schools are constitutionally denied direct access to public funding, but some forms of indirect access have been gradually admitted. Thirdly, the article examines new perspectives opened by recent statutes (in Italy) and decisions (in the USA) that are altering the traditional relationship between public/private and religious/secular which are going to offer a new, more equal role to religiously affiliated schools in both systems, preserving their spiritual identity and ethos.

In the last decade, the religious dimensions and significance of the European Union have been increasingly recognised. This paper sets out the role and regulation of religious associations within European law. Although it is often assumed that European competence does not touch on matters of religion, a jurisdictional separation of ‘economics’ and ‘religion’ has been increasingly hard to sustain. European law grants various privileges and exemptions to religious bodies. However, the dominant model to emerge is one of pluralism: distinctive substantive legal regimes applicable to religious bodies, and a distinctive participatory position within the governance of the European Union. However, the paper suggests that the pursuit of pluralism has not been entirely successful National diversity in this field coupled with the sheer complexity of achieving a reasonable balance of competing interests conspire to make it remarkably elusive. What is needed is a greater recognition of the right of States to adjust European legal requirements to accommodate the legitimate needs of the religious bodies within their jurisdiction and a renewed commitment to producing workable solutions in dialogue with religious associations.

This article looks closely at the legal nature of Establishment, both in England and North of the Border. The legal material shows that the two cases are very different. The Ace od Supermacy 1558 and related legislation enable the English church's porition to be presented so as to meke it one aspect of the State, and tetwntieth-century case-law has tended to confirm that understanding. The Scottish kirk enjoys statutory autonomy under the Church of Scotland Act 1921, and again case-law emphasises the reality of its exemption from some of the usual jurisdiction of the secular authorities and courts (though its scope may be becoming less clear-cut in the light of developments within the European Community). The author asks how, in the English context, the legal analysis relates to the reality of the English situation, as seen through the insights of other disciplines, to the role of the Church of England nationally and locally, and to the, sometimes confrontational, relationship between Synod and Parliament.

There is no single system of state-religion relations within Europe which is equal to another. Each one is distinct. Many countries know a number of different systems within themselves, as does the United Kingdom, Germany or France. The presence of history is strongest perhaps in this field of life. Tradition and truth, emotion and identity flourish in this field. Future law on religion in Europe is best built on strong regional structures. This paper reports on three aspects of state-religion relations in Europe: What is the situation in Germany? What does the United Kingdom look like from the continent? And what about Europe?

The primary virtue of establishment is the Church's duty under law to minister to anyone at all who may turn to it, including the ungodliest. Establishment does not imply a religious State, that is a State whose law requires subservience by the citizens to the State religion; if it did, it would be barbarous (but contrast the Black Rubric in the Book of Common Prayer). Establishment does not entail State control of the Church. The legal characteristics of establishment are as follows. (1) The law of the Church of England is part of the law of the land. (2) Bishops and some other office-holders are appointed by the Queen on ministerial advice. (3) 26 diocesan bishops sit as legislators in the House of Lords. (4) The Queen as Supreme Governor acts as monarch for the Church as she acts as monarch for the State. The Church of England is not a “congregational” church: its forms of worship are prescribed by law, and are not at the liberty of the community worshipping in any particular church. The bishops' resolution which authorised the use of the 1928 revision of the Book of Common Prayer in face of the will of Parliament (which was the lawful authority in the matter) was a lamentable disobedience to the law which it was their duty to uphold. Such a legal transgression might possibly nowadays be subject to correction by the High Court on judicial review, though that would require departure from earlier high authority. However that may be, it has to be recognised that there is no room, in the practice of an established Church, for the notion that conscience might justify disobedience to the law. The conscience of the believer is worth no more than the conscience of an unbeliever. The established Church possesses two immeasurable virtues: first, that religion is no tyrant: belief is not compulsory; second, that the Church's ministration is available to everyone. Their unified effect is a great force for good.

Is there an ethical dimension to the practice of ecclesiastical law? The Law Society and the Bar Council prescribe professional standards of conduct, as do certain statutes. Adhering to statutory and professional standards is important for maintaining good order in the administration of the law and the legal system. But are there wider duties and responsibilities that involve more than accountability to God, who expresses his presence and identity in the ecclesial communities that ecclesiastical lawyers serve?

Mathew's varied ecclesiastical progress presents a fascinating case study of an episcopate detached from a main-stream Christian community and alerts us to the danger of solely considering ‘episcopal lineage‘ as the litmus test for apostolicity. Mathew was born in France in 1852 and baptised a Roman Catholic; due to his mother's scruples he was soon re-baptised in the Anglican Church. He studied for the ministry in the Episcopal Church of Scotland, but sought baptism again in the Church of Rome, into which he was ordained as a priest in Glasgow in 1877. He became a Dominican in 1878, but only persevered a year, moving around a number of Catholic dioceses: Newcastle, Plymouth, Nottingham and Clifton. Here he came across immorality, and became a Unitarian. He next turned to the Church of England and the Diocese of London, but was soon in trouble for officiating without a licence. In 1890 he put forward his claim to Garter King of Arms for the title of 4th Earl of Llandaff of Thomastown, Co. Tipperary. He renounced the Church of England in 1899 because of vice. After founding a zoo in Brighton, which went bankrupt, he appeared in court in connection with a charge of embezzlement. He then became a Roman Catholic again, now as a layman.