This article is based upon Rousseau's vision of interdependence being a habitual source of conflict among nations. Today's version of collective security, in contrast to Woodrow Wilson's advocation of exclusive use of political and economic sanctions, often demands military action. Collective security offers inherent contradictions: Does multilateral action, for example, usually led by the United States, indicate international accord on countering the ‘aggressor’? The authors' answer is “no” because smaller nations may be joining the crusade for completely different reasons, for example, so as not to offend the larger partner. Does multilateral action always succeed in creating a Pax Universalis? No, on the contrary it may lead to war. Generally offering arguments from the U.S. perspective and examples from the Gulf War, Hendrickson sees neither collective action as necessarily a good thing nor unilateral action as necessarily a bad thing. However, he does urge reconsideration of the advantages of collective security as an all-powerful preventor of conflict.

This article looks at some major goals that have been set for sanctions and evaluates how effective sanctions have been at reaching those goals. It also examines the costs of sanctions, i.e., the impact on civilians and on international support for sanctions. Clawson concludes that sanctions are useful only as a short-term response in situations in which the world community is prepared to use force in the likely event that the target regime does not change its behavior. If there is not will to use force to back the sanctions, then the sanctions are morally dubious: they impose suffering and may cause deaths without offering a reasonable prospect of accomplishing good.

Zohar applies Talmudic views on communal sin to contemporary political discourse by posing the question “Are we our brothers' keepers?” The essay addresses international responsibility to protect victims of oppression worldwide. This discussion is particularly valuable in today's political system where the national sovereignty of a state may attempt to outweigh the victims' claim of persecution. While asserting that economic sanction, primarily boycott, in lieu of military action, is the most effective means of curtailing the actions of the oppressor government, he presents the views of Maimonides and Nachmanides on the Noahide Code of Jewish law. The former advocates full-scale embargo policy and holds all citizens responsible for acquiescing in the sins of their rulers and hence of communal sin, thereby justifying intervention. The latter, and more commonly accepted today, urges elimination of (direct or indirect) participation in the deeds of the perpetrators, the “clean-hands” approach, and hence allows for national boundaries to overshadow injustices occurring within them. Both types of boycott converge in that any transaction that fails to undermine the perpetrating regime is in some way facilitating its existence.

Recent interventions by non-Islamic states into conflicts involving Islamic nations have shifted the focus of debates within the Muslim community from the conflicts themselves to whether non-Muslim states have the moral right to intervene into Muslim matters at all. Hashmi delivers an overview of fundamental issues Western leaders ignored when evaluating their power of intervention in the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, Somalia, and Afghanistan. In Islamic law (sharia), for example, national sovereignty carries an explicitly separate and less clearly defined meaning than in Western philosophy. Lack of consensus within the international community on the definition and criteria of intervention exacerbates even further the flaw of not incorporating non-Western thought into the decision-making process of intervention. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Hashmi proposes this as a long overdue moment for reassessing the UN chapter on intervention, reappraising the value of human rights and justice, and most important, including Islamic thought into the new system.

In this essay Seth argues that it is not the case that international relations theory has suffered because domestic theory has prospered, but rather that both bear the marks of a signal failure to grasp the implications of, and to theorize adequately about, nationalism. She argues further that this failure is partly rooted in the phenomenon of nationalism itself, for it encapsulates many of the tensions and contradictions of modern thought. Finally, she suggests that the transformation of the international system from a system of states to a system of nation-states has had profound consequences for international relations, consequences not fully grasped in international relations theory.

This article is concerned mainly with the array of moral, ethnic, and nationalistic questions that emerged as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Its claim is that the cause for the collapse of the empire was not so much its poor economic performance, rather the moral bankruptcy of which the people could no longer endure. Now Russia (and the West) must tackle, for example, the rise of nationalism in the new states; the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia; the highly unstable new states and their drive to dominate Soviet troops stationed within their territorial boundaries. Russia's role as a great power is imperative in maintaining global peace and acting as a stabilizing force in the area, as it was throughout the Cold War era. Reemergence of morality in Russian politics is the main success of Yeltsin's government, yet what alarms the authors most of all is the immoral treatment of ethnic minorities within the breakaway republics. The West is urged to make relations with these countries contingent upon this issue. As for the future, though prospects for a comprehensive collective security structure encompassing all new states is not realistic, regional alliances based on mutual interests are likely to surface.

Springer focuses on the nature and challenges of “leadership” in contemporary environmental diplomacy since the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. He raises the importance of the issue of equity in international environmental law. Springer argues that competing conceptions of what is fair and just lie at the heart of much of the diplomatic disagreement over major environmental initiatives such as those debated at the Rio conference.

It may come as a surprise to many that the ICRC was the first agency established representing the International Red Cross and Red Crescent network to protect and assist victims of war and victims of politics. This article explores the ineffective consequences of international laws overseeing such victims and argues that proper implementation of these laws requires policy, without which laws can never be executed. ICRC has often coordinated relief for victims in such places as Somalia and Bosnia, in fact more than all the UN agencies combined, when the rest of the world was still ignoring them. When law is silent, and often during war time it is, human rights policies must be built on ethical choice.

Buultjens examines the utility of history as a paradigm on which to build a prognosis of the future. With examples from the past, the discussion centers around two fundamentals. First, historical patterns may prove to be faulty models as they tend to focus on clusters of events and, usually, on the leaders/victors of that era, hence not representing the entire picture. These leaders, says Buultjens, are typically MCGA-egoists who influence international politics through their personal motives. Second, these historic clusters seldom contain elements yielding enduring or transferable conclusions upon which to build valid prognoses for the future. From historical patterns, several trends emerge: (1) the phaseout of conflict after the Cold War; (2) modern government and media culture prevent the emergence of “political supermen” and minimize disruption; (3) democracy, in its familiar form, curtails its rate of expansion; and (4) the spirit of separatism permeates as a result of collapse of yet another empire. The author is not in favor of disregarding historical analyses, but rather in questioning messages it provides so as not to extract erroneous lessons.

This essay is a discussion of Reinhold Niebuhr's 1932 classic Moral Man, which critiques the Liberal Movement up to the 1930s. Little reviews some of the books fundamental conclusions. First, according to Niebuhr, to believe that individual self-interest is fulfilled in a collective good is to subscribe to a “utopian illusion”. He faults liberals for allowing themselves to be victims of the Enlightenment, i.e. being incurable optimistically rational about morals and politics. Second, he addresses the issue of the will for power inevitably dominating the will for good. Liberalism, in the sense of Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, and John Locke, lends itself as a venue for this to occur through its condonation of egoism as the intrinsic element of total social harmony. Little develops on Niebuhr's theory of conscience where there is a sharp distinction between individual and collective morality, the latter being much less susceptible to liberal morality than the former. Where individuals are endowed with an emotional sense of sympathy and consideration toward their kind, groups or nations would find this difficult, if not impossible due to their inclusive nature. Finally, he points out the mixture of morality and power in national life: where politics, while being inseparable from virtue and legitimacy, still abuses those beliefs in the interests of “national egoism”. When moral language is used in international politics without application of self-criticism, it diverts attention from the real motives of the statesmen who use it. Little does indicate deficiencies in Niebuhr's attempts to recover liberalism in his later writings toward the end of the essay.

Dewey's refusal to abandon his strong belief in the democratic ideal, which must materialize not via powerful political elites but rather through publicly created institutions and full participation of ordinary citizens, has been grossly misunderstood. Using Dewey's critics' own arguments that purport to show Dewey intentionally, or naively, disregarded the role of power in the relations of communities, Westbrook brings examples to reinforce the contrary view. Dewey's adherence to the view that war must be universally outlawed and sanctioned was targeted precisely on the international political elites in order to reduce their domination and to maintain the real power within the hands of the citizens.

Nolan reviews three works describing the influence of ethics on modern international relations, namely Code of Peace: Ethics and Security in the World of the Warlord States (Dorothy V. Jones); The Age of Rights (Louis Henkin); and Morality and American Foreign Policy: The Role of Ethics in International Affairs (Robert W. McElroy). All present timely academic and historical arguments for existing opportunities to bring ethics into world politics. Jones and Henkin concern themselves most with moral principles involved in establishing international law and organizations, while McElroy discusses the same issues from the unique perspective of U.S. foreign policy. Nolan gives full recognition to the traditional role of democratic states, particularly the United States., in shaping the moral norms of the international system in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries through ethics that are Western in origin but certainly not in their inherent content.