L'Épineuse et redoutable question de l'infini surgit, d'une façon ou d'une autre, à tous les paliers et dans tous les secteurs de la connaissance. Mais c'est incontestablement en mathé-matique que l'infini occupe la plus large place. “If in summing up, écrit Hermann Weyl, a brief phrase is called for that characterizes the life center of mathematics one might well say: mathematics is the science of the infinite”. Et s'il faut reconnaître l'importance capitale du rôle que l'infini joue en mathématiques, il faut également reconnaître le caractère paradoxal de ce rôle. En effet, bannir l'infini des mathématiques équivaudrait à les amputer au point de les ramener à un état primitif, embryonnaire; la présence en elles de l'infini et l'usage qu'elles en font sont, sans l'ombre d'un doute, á la source même de leur prodigieux développement, de leur étonnante fécondité. Qu'on songe seulement aux processus infinis dont la maîtrise leur a permis de devenir un instrument sans rival dans l'exploration du monde quantitatif.

Many writers, and even Professor Hempel himself, have said that Hempel's definition of confirmation has the consequence that ‘AH ravens are black’ is confirmed by any non-black non-raven. This consequence is often referred to as the paradox of the ravens, and I will sometimes refer to it so. But I do not assume that this supposed consequence is paradoxical, and in fact I will not touch at all on the question whether it is. My object is just to show that in any case it is not a consequence of Hempel's definition and that its closest relative, among the genuine consequences of that definition, is not paradoxical, even superficially.

Whether one can decide or choose to believe is a difficult problem, with important consequences for ethics. An appeal to ordinary language is not likely to be decisive. On occasion, “I choose to believe,” “he adopted the belief,” and “do not believe,” find use. Of course, one can decide or choose to pursue belief. Pascal gave a prescription for producing certain religious beliefs. There are other prescriptions for other beliefs. Is there a stronger sense in which I can decide or choose to believe ? I do not use a causal recipe in performing many actions. Is there some way of choosing or deciding to believe that does not involve causal recipes.

Sous sa forme définitive, le cogito augustinien apparaît, en réponse aux arguments des Académiciens, comme un “si enim fallor, sum: si je me trompe, je suis”. Parallèlement à la Cité de Dieu, Augustin écrivait dans son traité sur la Trinité que cette vérité originaire est une certitude du type “je sais que je vis”. C'est par une science intime (intima scientia) que mon âme a l'intelligence de sa vie si elle se trompe, tout comme elle a la certitude du bonheur même si elle s'égare sur l'objet de sa béatitude.

Le désir de l'indubitable est un fait indubitable. Toutes les theories de la connaissance en sont à la fois la conséquence et la preuve. Toutes les doctrines épistémologiques se développent à partir de l'idée qu'on se fait de la nature des données premières. On juge la connaissance par rapport à ses éléments qu'on accepte comme certains. Le certain, l'indubitable est une limite au delà de laquelle on ne peut pas, et on ne désire pas aller. C'est aussi une ratio ultima de tout effort intellectuel, le but suprême et la justification finale des modes ou des étapes de la connaissance qui restent en deçà de leur idéal. Sans lui, tout savoir n'est qu'une illusion, une folle aventure, sans but, sans valeur et sans espoir. Dans cette éventualité, la raison n'est qu'une déraison, une faculté superflue, sans justification, done un désordre dans la nature.

In the present paper I wish to consider three important features of some or all “revisionary” aesthetic theories, which disqualify them as accounts of the nature of art. By ‘revisionary theory’ I mean a theory which overtly modifies, or altogether abandons, the ordinary meanings of the key terms it utilizes. The Expression theory, Intuitionist theories, Formalist theories and Symbolist theories are some of those I have in mind. There is one extremely important feature which these have in common with practically all other classical and current aesthetic theories, which I shall not consider.

A Philosopher writes a book about ontology and the philosophy of language. That is, the first parts of his book talk explicitly about ontology; the latter parts, explicitly about language. And there are some propositions which are about both. It is a difficult book, and would-be commentators cast about for some way to approach it. In most cases, they will resolve their quandaries by plunging in at the beginning and doggedly making their respective ways to the end. But some may notice that the book as a whole is dominated by one key idea. And that, in turn, may lead them to reflect that perhaps it might prove more edifying to begin with language.

Le problème de la vérité a toujours préoccupé l'esprit humain; il hante pour ainsi dire l'homme d'aujourd'hui. Dans les brèves réflexions qui vont suivre, nous nous proposons de présenter une approximation tres limitée de ce problème tel qu'il se pose à la philosophic traditionnelle, à savoir: Le caractère historique et relatifde la connaissance humaine est-il conciliable avec I'affirmation de vérites immuables?

In “Moral Responsibility for Dreams,” Harvey Mullane maintains that although there is something inappropriate about blaming people for their dreams, this is because we do not have very direct control over our dreams: but although this is the case, it is not the case that we have no control over them. We can work at having the right dreams, or not having the wrong ones, as we can work at blushing and not blushing and at loving our neighbour: and therefore presumably (although he does not say this) there must be a sense in which or a degree to which we can be responsible for what we dream. There are a number of aspects of this question, and of Mullane's treatment of it, which I would like to explore further.

Professor Braybrooke has presented some interesting and novel points in support of the emotive theory in his recent paper. I imagine that his points are designed to worry objectivists or antiemotivists. In this note I will try to show that they need not worry very much.

1. In addition to moral sentences and factual sentences (M-locutions and F-locutions) we should pick out for comparison a class of expressive sentences (E-locutions) whose function is to express or evince emotions. I much prefer “express” to Braybrooke's “display” here. Examples of expressive sentences are: “I am angry,” “I am afraid,” “I am furious,” “I am very pleased,” etc.

K. R. Eissler's book is a significant contribution to the study of the psychological process of creation and of the origin of genius, insofar as that problem can be illuminated by a psychoanalytic inquiry into one crucial period in the life of one man of genius: Goethe.

Some readers may be frightened by the size of these two volumes, totalling 1538 pages with a complex apparatus of footnotes and appendices (the many quotations from Goethe given in English translation are always substantiated with the German original text in footnotes).