This paper focuses on Heidegger's 1937 lecture course on the Nietzschean doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same. Heidegger interprets the motive of recurrence in Nietzsche as the Moment (Augenblick) of the Eternal Recurrence. Through this key motive of the moment, we try then to examine the double function of the doctrine which, on the one hand, refers us back to some essential themes of the existential analytics, whereas, on the other hand, it paves the way for the new confrontation with metaphysics in the Beiträge zur Philosophie. We hold that the turning away from the existential conception of the moment toward its “aletheiological” understanding in terms of a “site of the Moment” (die Augenblicksstätte) takes place in the context of this very lecture course. This transition is even more critical as it constitutes the very heart of Heidegger's critique of subjectivity in the new perspective opened by the history of Being: Nietzsche's doctrine of time provides the basis for this questioning.

The non-existence of fictional entities does not seem incompatible with their possible existence. The aim of this paper is to give an account of the intuitive truth of statements of possible existence involving fictional proper names in an actualist framework. After having made clear the opposition between a possibilist and an actualist approach of possible worlds, I distinguish between fictional individuals and fictional characters and between the fictional use of fictional proper names and their metafictional use. On that basis, statements of possible existence involving fictional proper names appear to say of fictional characters conceived as abstact objects that they might have been exemplified.

We believe that, granting radical holism, a homophonie (or disquotational) definition of truth for a language achieves no progress towards guaranteeing the material equivalence of the left- and right-hand-side sentences for T-sentences. In order to avoid paradoxes such as the antinomy of the liar, Tarski requires that the metalanguage be semantically richer than the object language. For a radical holist, the difference in semantic powers of the meta- and object languages means that homophony is no guarantee of synonymy; therefore, worries about the indeterminacy of translation still apply.