Since 1980, in their pursuit of economic development, reformist Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders have decentralized personnel administration and transferred formal authority over some personnel matters to state institutions. To manage its more complex economy, Party authorities have been forced to select professionals and specialists based in part on their technical qualifications and job performance. To a limited extent, the Party has begun to place personnel management in the hands of experts who are competent to assess the qualifications and work of their peers, and directly in the hands of employing institutions. The CCP has beat a limited, if unsteady retreat.

China's de jure urbanization level more than doubled in the five years between 1982 and 1987, jumping from 20.8 per cent to 46 6 per cent (Table 1). The Chinese State Statistical Bureau (SSB) officials explained that this unprecedented increase was largely the result of an increase in the number of urban towns since the mid 1984 relaxation of criteria for urban town designation.1 This is, however, only a partial explanation. My own analysis shows that much of the gain in the town population was in fact due to the post-1984 governing system of“town administering village” (zhen guan cun). Many newly designated urban towns (and some existing towns as well) have enlarged their administrative territories to include a huge number of agricultural residents in their official urban population. Most of these rural persons, however, judged by strict occupational and residential criteria, should not have been counted as urban population. The inclusion of many agricultural persons in the urban sector since mid 1984 has thus greatly exaggerated the actual urbanization level.2

The consumption structure in China has undergone a dramatic change since the economic reform started in late 1979. Durable goods ownership, an important aspect of overall consumption, has experi enced an even greater change both in variety and quantity. Analyses of general consumption in China are found in Lardy, Van der Gaag, Hu et al. and Zhang et al.1 Quantitative analysis devoted solely to durable goods consumption in Chinese cities has rarely been undertaken.

Zhang Xinxin and Zhang Jie are two contemporary Chinese women writers. They began to publish in the post–Cultural Revolution era, and became well–known in the early 1980s for their fictional depiction of the problems of urban intellectual women attempting to resolve conflicts between love and career, love and marriage, and ideals and reality. Although the works of both authors present a limited challenge to traditions they believe have served to oppress women, a clear generational difference is perceptible in the attitudes they each express through their characters. Zhang Jie, born in 1937 and reaching adulthood in the idealistic climate of the 1950s, presents characters strongly influenced by both Confucian morality and socialist ideals, while Zhang Xinxin, who was born in 1953 and grew up during the Cultural Revolution period (a disillusioning experience for most of her generation), presents characters who show little enthusiasm for political ideals and are less constrained by traditional morality.

The China Quarterly Two major factors have continued to impair diplomatic relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Vatican, namely, the so-called “two-China” problem and the independence issue. China regards the Vatican’s diplomatic relations with Taiwan as an infringement of her sovereignty, and insists they are terminated prior to her consideration of a resumption of relations (broken off in 1958) with the Holy See. The Vatican is now the only state in Europe to maintain diplomatic links with Taiwan. Moreover, the Chinese Catholic Church wishes to remain independent of the Pope in Rome. This issue is manifested in the “self-consecration” of bishops in China without seeking the Pope’s prior approval. The “two-China” problem is basically a political and diplomatic one whereas the independence issue has religious as well as political implications. Both China and the Vatican recognize the existence of these two areas of dispute but they differ in their approach towards achieving a possible resolution. China demands that the Vatican should take steps to solve the “two-China” problem before China is ready to discuss the independence question, whereas the Vatican expects China to concede on the latter point first by acknowledging the Pope as the head of the universal Church, before proceeding to discuss other matters, including the status of the Vatican’s diplomatic ties with Taiwan. These different approaches lead to the present stalemate. Each side is expecting the other to take the initiative to overcome the apparent deadlock.

Under the terms of a secret agreement reached between China and Portugal in 1979, Portugal was to continue administering Macao but sovereignty was transferred to China. Eight years later however, the Sino–Portuguese agreement on Macao's future was signed, which stipulated that it would become a Chinese Special Administrative Region on 20 December 1999. Whereas the transitional stage from Portuguese to Chinese administration began in 1987, political development started in 1976 when the principle of democracy was introduced into the colonial legislature (two years after a military coup had toppled the regime of Marcello Caetano in Portugal). This article will explore aspects of Macao's political development since the Portuguese revolution in 1974.

The Fourth and Fifth Plenary Sessions of the 13th Central Committee(CC) were the first comprehensive central Party meetings to be convened in the aftermath of the suppression of the “pro–democracy” movement in and around Tiananmen Square. Although held roughly four months apart, they can be considered together insofar as both sought to consolidate and confirm the legitimacy of the new hardline leadership. While the agendas of the two plenums varied, both dealt with the impact of the momentous events of April–June particularly in terms of their effects on: leadership personnel; public security; ideology and propaganda; economic policy; civil–military relations; and foreign affairs.