Contributors

When I started doing clinical ethics rounds, in the mid 1980s, I decided to venture onto the pediatrics ward. The first patient I encountered was a 3-year-old girl returning to her room, groggy from general anesthesia. When I inquired about her, the nurse explained that she had just gone through the procedure to donate bone marrow for her 1-year-old sister, who was preparing to undergo bone marrow transplantation for leukemia.

Attempting to balance the needs and interests of minors with the obligation to protect them from their own potentially harmful decisions poses an ethical challenge for the physician. This problem is further exacerbated when the context is not medical treatment but organ donation. That is, medical treatment scenarios generally involve decisions likely to result in objective improvements to the minor's health status. Consent to organ donation, however, raises several vexing problems. First, how should the provider measure both the cognitive ability and competence to consent of the minor to ensure that the minor comprehends the risks and benefits of donation and that no coercion is involved? Second, given that improvement of one's health is an unlikely scenario, is there a way to measure subjective determinations of satisfaction and altruism enjoyed by a minor following organ donation? If so, should the physician regard these values in a manner analogous to physical improvement? Finally, are parents the appropriate decisionmakers for their children when a sibling-to-sibling donation occurs? Is it possible for parents to always act in the best interests of both children in this event?

What standard or principle should guide decisionmaking concerning the permissibility of allowing children to be organ donors? For a long time, it has been widely assumed that the best interest of the child is the appropriate standard. But recently, several critics have charged that this standard fails to give due weight to the interests of the family and the intimate relationships that the family makes possible.1,2 This article reviews and rejects both the best-interest standard (as it has been traditionally conceived) and the alternative standard recommended by the critics. I then propose a new standard to help parents, healthcare professionals, and judges decide when it is and is not permissible for children to serve as organ donors. This new standard modifies and broadens the best-interest standard to allow it to account adequately for the contribution that intimate relationships make to the well-being of children.

Despite the much-discussed court cases in the 1970s that permitted some sibling-to-sibling kidney donations from minors,1 principles that can guide parental, medical, or judicial decisionmaking are neither clearly articulated nor uncontroversial.

The child was 2 years, 8 months old and weighed 25 pounds, one-fifth the weight of her mother, for whom she was to be the bone marrow donor. The mother had suffered a relapse of acute myelogenous leukemia; her physicians recommended a bone marrow transplant. The child was the closest human leukocyte antigen (HLA) match and thus the best donor candidate for her mother's transplant.

At the end of 1999 the Danish Council of Ethics published a report on organ and tissue donation from living donors. The report focused on kidney and bone marrow transplantations (BMTs), as these are presently the most common transplantations from live donors. During the work on the report, it became clear to the Council that, apart from problems concerning coercion and commercialization that affected both adult and child donors, by far the largest ethical problems occurred in donations from children.

My task is to provide some critical commentary on the preceding essays. My unfortunate conclusion will be that the issues that are their primary focus are more likely to become more ethically intractable over the next several years as medicine progresses. I do not see any easy or obvious way to avoid this conclusion.

These CQ Sources were compiled by Bette Anton.

In a lively, interesting, and provocative paper Tuija Takala charges Julian Savulescu and me with bringing utilitarianism into disrepute and indeed with attempting to shoot it down, presumably in flames.1 Takala does not mince words. When she suggests that in our writings “utilitarianism is turning into the monster its critics always thought it was” (p. 447), she is associating herself with those who charge us (and others) with propounding, again her words, the “inhumane theory that allows the sacrifice of minorities, the killing of the innocent, and simplistic calculations on the value of life” (p. 447). Perhaps surprisingly for someone who identifies herself strongly with utilitarianism, Takala seems to take the worst and most ignorant critics of consequentialism generally, and of utilitarianism in particular, at face value and suggests that because their lazy, tendentious, and misdirected attacks on those they take to be utilitarians are often made against Savulescu and me that we somehow bear responsibility for this and for any charges they make, however ill judged or poorly supported by evidence.

“Dissecting Bioethics,” edited by Tuija Takala and Matti Häyry, welcomes contributions on the conceptual and theoretical dimensions of bioethics.

The section is dedicated to the idea that words defined by bioethicists and others should not be allowed to imprison people's actual concerns, emotions, and thoughts. Papers that expose the many meanings of a concept, describe the different readings of a moral doctrine, or provide an alternative angle to seemingly self-evident issues are therefore particularly appreciated.

The themes covered in the section so far include dignity, naturalness, public interest, community, disability, autonomy, parity of reasoning, symbolic appeals, and toleration.

All submitted papers are peer reviewed. To submit a paper or to discuss a suitable topic, contact Tuija Takala at tuija.takala@helsinki.fi.

Addressing groups of industrial or academic experts goes with my job as editor in chief of Scientific American, and I enjoy it, but I confess that it inevitably feels peculiar. The audience consists of people who, almost by definition, have expertise or experience in the subjects of discussion. Why should anyone listen to me? I am a journalist—what do I know?This article is adapted from a luncheon address delivered by the author on April 29, 2003, to attendees of the BioTechnica America 2003 conference held in Santa Monica, California.

In the fall of 2001, Baxter International, Inc., was faced with a crisis after more than 50 people died using Baxter dialyzers. In this interview, Harry M. Jansen Kraemer, Jr., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Baxter, and Sally Benjamin Young, Vice President, Communications, discuss how the company managed this emergency situation.

Over the past year, aggressive billing practices have been exposed at a number of hospitals in the United States. Despite the fact that a widower had paid $16,000 of his late wife's bill of $18,740, some 20 years after the incurrence of the bill a teaching hospital held a lien on his home for $40,000 in interest. Many years earlier the hospital had seized his bank account, and now the 77-year-old man was destitute. Only tremendous publicity caused the hospital to back down. That same week, another nonprofit teaching hospital reportedly drove a 25-year-old uninsured woman from New York City while dunning her for a $19,000 bill for a two-day stay for an appendectomy. In California, a patient was forced into bankruptcy in 2000 by a for-profit hospital from a day-and-a-half stay in the hospital that did not include any surgery but totaled $48,000 in hospital bills. These have become common stories as hospitals aggressively market, bill, collect, and foreclose, just like any other corporation. The uninsured are facing the brunt of the hospital industry's billing practices.

In Community as Healing, Micah Hester aspires to offer a bold alternative to the theoretical approach that has dominated bioethics since the 1970s. He begins by claiming that the concepts of individual patient autonomy portrayed in the well-known works of Tom Beauchamp and James Childress in Principles of Biomedical Ethics and H. Tristram Engelhardt in The Foundations of Bioethics are inadequate. As he states:

This section is meant to be a mutual effort. If you find an article you think should be abstracted in this section, do not be bashful—submit it for consideration to feature editor Kenneth V. Iserson care of CQ. If you do not like the editorial comments, this will give you an opportunity to respond in the letters section. Your input is desired and anticipated.