This will be a random paper. I would rather give it a title at the end, when I have finished, than at the beginning, before I have started: but if christening must precede development, I will call it ‘Some Reflections on Law and Lawyers’. Though it is well to remember how formidable an essay was in the past concealed under the disarming title of Reflections. In truth, the law seduces men of learning by the variety of its attractions and the specialisation which it encourages may prove, I think, a source of its undoing. We are all experts today; and experts, like kings, may rave, for all that the blows fall thick and fast upon the Achaeans.

In his Inaugural Lecture as Downing Professor at Cambridge in 1888 F. W. Maitland, after introducing to his hearers certain matters—the variety, classification and enormous mass of Legal Records surviving in England—which were then little appreciated, went on to develop two lines of thought: first, that the wealth of evidence contained in these Records needed, if it was to be utilised, the labour of Scholars trained in the Law; and second, that it was evidence not only for Legal Historians but also, and much more, for other Historians and Students of every kind. The first of these propositions needs a little qualification: indeed Maitland himself would, I am sure, now qualify it, for some of the most enthusiastic and most successful Scholars who have followed in his footsteps have been not Lawyers but Historians. Still it remains true that the first and worst difficulties to be solved are legal ones, obscurities not soluble by any of the ordinary aids to the understanding of ancient Documents in general but arising from points of Law: some of them points which the Historian might puzzle over for hours whereas the Lawyer would solve them in a moment; all of them peculiar to this one great category of Records.

The purpose of this article is to consider whether, and if so to what extent, a limitation following one which is void for remoteness is itself void. The subject is one of the most obscure in the rule against perpetuities, and it has always seemed to me that the well-known monographs are at their least satisfactory on this topic-Although I have no desire to revive old controversies, it will not be possible to avoid occasional references to such controversial matters as the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell, the application of the modern rule against perpetuities to legal contingent remainders, and the scope of the cy-près doctrine.

… It is my purpose today to attempt to deal with one or two elementary matters which may, I think, cause preliminary difficulty to a person endeavouring to study and compare civil procedure in France and in England.

‘ … It is certain’, says Winfield, in writing of the liability for torts committed by servants of corporations, ‘that, whatever the law may be where the corporation has expressly authorised the commission of an ultra vires tort, no authority to the servant or agent to commit such a tort can be implied’ : and he illustrates his point by the well-known case of Poulton v. L. & S. W. Ry. Poulton, in terms of an arrangement which he had made with the railway company, was entitled to free carriage of a horse. At the end of the journey the local stationmaster demanded payment for the carriage of the horse; Poulton refused to pay, and the stationmaster detained him. The Court of Appeal held that the railway company was empowered to detain goods, but not persons, for non-payment of carriage; that accordingly they had no power to detain Poulton, even on the assumption that he had wrongfully taken the horse by train without paying; that there could be no authority for the arrest implied to the stationmaster; and that his employers were not liable for his tortious act.

Twenty years ago Mr. Cairns set himself the task of looking at law from three points of view, that of the social sciences, that of logic and the empirical sciences, and that of philosophy. Law and the Social Sciences was published in 1935, the Theory of Legal Science in 1941. The volume under review completes the trilogy. The object of all these volumes is the same—‘To construct the foundation of a theory of law which is the necessary antecedeat of a possible jurisprudence’. All those who have come under the spell of Mr. Cairns' stimulating thought will look forward with the greatest interest to the application and expansion of his conclusions which is now promised us in a projected final work, The Elements of Legal Theory.

It may be convenient in conclusion to attempt to restate the ambit of the first two exceptions in the light of cases decided since Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co., Ltd.:—

(1) The court is entitled and bound to decide which of two conflicting decisions of its own it will follow, whether the second decision was reached in ignorance of the first, or the first decision was discussed and distinguished in the second. (The rider to the formulation of the exceptions in the Young Case is the product of the subsequent decisions in Battersby v. Anglo-American Oil Co., Ltd. and Fisher v. Ruislip-Northwood U.D.C.)

It appears that when the court has once decided that there is a conflict between two or more previous decisions and purported to resolve it that resolution is final in the sense that a subsequent court cannot then prefer the rejected decision. It is doubtful whether it is open to a subsequent court to decide there was no conflict at all, but it is suggested that no such power should be conceded, although Fisher v. Ruislip-Northwood U.D.C. permits it where the second exception is concerned.

When the court has once decided that there is no conflict between two or more previous decisions, it is not open to a subsequent court to hold that there is in fact a conflict and thereby confer upon itself jurisdiction to make a selection: Hogan v. Bentinck Collieries. Fisher v. Ruislip-Northwood U.D.C. is to the contrary, but should be overruled on this point. The Court of Appeal has, of course, power to choose between these two conflicting authorities when the point again comes before it.

(2) The court is bound to refuse to follow a decision of its own which was reached in ignorance of a previous decision of the House of Lords that covers the point, or which, though not expressly overruled, cannot, in its opinion, stand with a subsequent decision of the House of Lords, or which is expressly disapproved in considered dicta by a majority in the House of Lords: Leathley v. John Fowler and Co., Ltd. [1946] K.B. 579.

Where the House of Lords decision comes first, and the decision is discussed and distinguished in the later Court of Appeal decision, the Court of Appeal in the case sub iudice is bound by the Court of Appeal decision according to Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co., Ltd. and Williams v. Glasbrook Brothers, Ltd., but according to Fitzsimmons v. Ford Motor Co., Ltd., is under a duty to follow the House of Lords decision if, in its opinion, there is a conflict. There is stronger authority in support of the Williams v. Glasbrook Brothers, Ltd. decision, that of a ‘full’ court, but the ruling in the Fitzsimmons Case should be preferred, as it is unreasonable to treat the first and second exceptions differently. The Court of Appeal has, of course, power to choose between the two lines of authorities when the question next arises.

If the Fitzsimmons Case is preferred, it has been held in Fisher v. Ruislip-Northwood U.D.C. that a subsequent court can decide that there was no conflict at all, and revive the discarded Court of Appeal decision, but it is suggested that this view should not be followed.

In September, 1194, Richard I, having returned from a disastrous captivity, sent itinerant justices around the country to reclaim and reorganise royal rights. According to Roger of Hoveden, they were instructed to put into writing all lands, housestae Mariae Ecclesia and William de Chemilli, such contracts should be made. The charter embodying the contract was to be made in the form of a chyrograph, of which one part was to be kept should remain in the area [area = chest = huche]. The area was to be secured by three locks: the Christians were to have one key, the Jews a second and the two Williams a third, and they should each of them seal the lock the key of which they heldt by the Jew, sealed with the seal of him to whom the money was lent, rents and possessions of the Jews. They should also provide six or seven places in which the Jews should make all their contracts, and appoint two law-worthy Christians, two law-worthy Jews and two law-worthy writers before whom, together with William de Sanc: the other par. The clerks of the two Williams should keep a roll of the transcripts of all charters: they were exhorted to keep the roll up to date, in return for which they were to receive one penny for evor. Five or more of the appointed oery charter made, twopence going between the writers, the total payment of three-pence being levied equally from the debtor and creditfficials were required to be present at each transaction, and the three groups, the Christians, the Jews and the keepers of the rolls were each to maintain a roll embodying payments made to the Jews.