After briefly pointing out the weakness of participation at the core of the Regional Committees for Economic Expansion (CREE), the author analyses in depth the notion of participation as it has existed in France since the administrative reform of March 14, 1964, within the Commissions of Regional Economic Development (CODER).

Having touched on the place occupied by and the role played by these organizations throughout the process of elaboration, execution, and control of the plan at the regional districts level, the author then turns to an examination of the composition and function of these consultative processes.

As far as the composition of the CODER is concerned, the article deals with three main features: the tripartite nature of the commissions; the imbalance of forces particularly to the detriment of the trade unions; and the major reforms capable of improving the representativeness of the commission.

Regarding the functioning of the CODERs, the author, having described the vast range of duties which are devolved on them by the texts, puts into perspective the extreme weakness of their “powers” in contrast to the unquestionable authority of the regional prefect. Thus, the CODERs are described as bodies directly under prefectorial control, veritable registry offices deeply divided at their centre, without real expertise and without great impact on public opinion.

At the end of the study the author recalls the abortive attempt at regional reform on April 27, 1969, and concludes that it will be necessary to set to work on a far-reaching reform in order to get France on the road towards real democratization of the process of regional planning.

Urbanization is challenging traditional politics. Forces attempting to stop the growth of the power of the metropolis must abandon the idea. New types of problems, their urgency, new élites, an urbanized citizenry, and a new balance of power are calling for a new type of political society. Historically dated nation-states may disappear.

It can be said that in the Liberal back bench there are 20 members, or 16.4 per cent of the total doing 36.8 per cent of the committee work. Similarly, 27.1 per cent of the members are doing 52.8 per cent of the committee work. One of the major complaints of government members is the extremely heavy work load which has been aggravated by the recent changes in the rules and procedures of the House. Indeed, if one is listening to the complaints of a member who is in this 27.1 per cent group, his complaints are justified and real. One must conclude that the remaining 53.2 per cent who are responsible for only 25.4 per cent of the committee work must be the victims of work from another source.

I am grateful to Professor Wand for devoting so much space to my “conceptual apparatus.” I should have been more grateful if he had got it more nearly right. His criticism of my concepts, particularly of the central concept of powers, is so wide of the mark that one wonders about his concept of criticism. The puzzle is how he can pronounce with such assurance his “grave charges” that my thought is confused and misleading. The answer I shall suggest is partly (a) that he has not paid attention to my definitions, and partly (b) that he has tried to fit my argument into a conceptual framework – his own – which he assumes has some absolute validity. Perhaps (b) accounts for (a): he was perhaps unable to read what I wrote because it does not fit his conceptual scheme. Let me take in reverse order his criticisms of the three concepts he deals with.