Generalizations about the merger movement in America at the turn of the century have too open been predicated upon inadequate information about the motives and mechanisms involved and the results achieved. This has been particularly true of those combinations in which the firm of J. P. Morgan & Company was involved. The International Mercantile Marine Company merger of 1902 has hitherto been misrepresented as a promotion of Wall Street. The subsequent course of this venture shows how even a combination of the world's most astute bankers and shipping men could be misled in analysis and held powerless to affect their own destiny by the march of economic and political events. Not all the grand combinations of the early twentieth century yielded lush promotional profits; neither should the evidence of overcapitalization in such combinations always be accepted at face value.

A half century ago the conflict over state regulation of railroads was the chief issue in Alabama politics. Two staunch advocates led the rival forces. Both leaders were in agreement on the need to develop the industrial capacities of the state, but each sponsored violently opposing concepts of how this could best be done. The present article, by presenting the two sides of the Alabama controversy, provides us with insights into the national dilemma over government regulation of business which developed after the Civil War.

At a time when American shipping generally was finding it difficult to compete in international trade, certain American shipping groups were profiting largely. The strength of the American-Hawaiian Steamship Company derived from conservative financial policy, bold but not reckless expansion, astute analysis of trading opportunities, skillful handling of competition, and decisive adaptation to emergencies. A closely knit group of owner-managers held the reins of control. Internal strength permitted optimum realizations from a favorable commercial environment and even helped to make that environment favorable.

Historians have recorded some of the more spectacular failures in American business, but the subject of business failure in itself has not been intensively studied. To lay the groundwork for such a study, the experience of individual firms should be examined in detail and attention should be directed to small as well as large business units. The history of Smith & Griggs provides an example of “discontinuance” which came about not as a result of a single catastrophic event but by a process of long-time attrition involving every phase of the company's operations.