The debate about the idea of “varieties of capitalism,” which was formalized by Peter Hall and David Soskice in their 2001 book on the subject, has attracted the work of business historians, as well as of political scientists, and economists.

How does economic organization affect economic performance? This analysis of the historical transformation of the U.S. economy from the business model of the “old economy” to that of the “new economy” demonstrates that the Japanese challenge of the 1980s was an important catalyst for the shift. Anchored by the “Chandlerian” corporation, the old model delivered economic growth that was much more equitable and stable than the new one. Furthermore, the business model that underpinned the Japanese challenge represented a superior version of the old U.S. prototype. The fi nancialization of corporate decision-making under the new paradigm has been the prime source of inequity and instability in U.S. economic performance over the past three decades. As manifested in outsized executive pay and massive stock buybacks, the fi nancialization of the U.S. corporation threatens long-term economic growth.

This examination of the foundations of German and American corporate governance highlights the role of money-centered banks, both as board members in large corporations and as intermediaries on the stock exchange. German banks, by acting as surrogate regulators, became institutional stabilizers, and German regulators encouraged banks to participate in corporate boards in order to overcome agency problems in firms and to control speculation. American investment banks, prior to 1914, often managed to overcome regulatory obstacles, which enabled them to wield more power over corporations than their legendary German counterparts. American banks had more opportunities to intervene in the event of panics, bankruptcies, foreign investment, and corporate consolidation. In contrast to Germany, the United States increasingly imposed regulations that circumscribed the supervisory role of banks as board members.

The organization of economic activities differs among countries and over time. Differences between nations have been highlighted in academic discussions about national business systems and the varieties of capitalism. This group of articles about the Dutch business system contributes to these debates by offering new empirical research from the perspective of a small, open economy and highlighting changes that have occurred during the second half of the twentieth century. While they discuss developments in the Netherlands, the articles also explore general themes, including corporate governance, cartels, and the organization of multinational companies. While the articles show that business systems are in constant flux, comparisons between the Dutch and U.S. systems seem to suggest that each moves at a different pace. A particularly striking aspect of the Dutch stories is the large impact of developments abroad.

Cartels were critical to the shaping of twentieth-century market structures. Although laws against cartels began to be passed in the 1950s, the attitude toward these collusive organizations remained constant over most of the century. Enforcement did not begin until well into the 1990s. Dutch policy within the European framework underwent a series of adjustments, and changes in the Dutch business system indicate a shift toward a more liberal market economy, which was accompanied by an increasingly negative view of cartels.

This study traces the evolution of corporate governance and financing structures in the Netherlands during the second half of the twentieth century. A description of Dutch shareholder rights, fi nancing structures, and networks of directors reveals the changes that have occurred in many aspects of the Dutch corporate system over the course of six decades. The case of Royal Ahold illustrates some of the developments that have taken place. Most indicate a transition from a coordinated market economy to a more liberal system. The internationalization of the Dutch economy, which has played an important role in the transition of the system, is reflected in the expansion of Dutch firms beyond the national borders and in the growing number of foreign investors in Dutch fi rms.

The impact of the strategies of multinational companies on the Dutch business system during the twentieth century is described in relation to two fi rms. The fi rst case examines the attitude of the Dutch (in this example, Anglo-Dutch) parent company Royal Dutch Shell toward its international subsidiaries. The second looks at the approach taken by the American company Sara Lee toward its Dutch subsidiary, Douwe Egberts. Until the 1980s, both companies were prepared to adjust their organizations to national traditions and ambitions. However, when these nationally based global fi rms came under pressure during that decade, both changed their organizational structures. Their actions can be seen both as responses to globalization and as attempts to advance that process by simultaneously building international institutions and changing elements of the national business system in the Netherlands.