The history and development of land tenure in Iran have been affected by many factors, including climatic conditions, scarcity of water, lack of security, widespread tribalism, and legal and administrative confusion. In addition to limitations in resources, political instability in the premodern period molded systems of land tenure in Iran. Changes of dynasty were frequent and usually followed by the confiscation and redistribution of land. The Qajar dynasty (1788–1925), which came to power after a long period of anarchy and civil war, continued that general pattern. There were three classes of land ownership in Iran in this period: waqfs (religious endowments), arbābī (land owned by large landlords), and khāliṣah (state-owned lands). This last category was composed of lands confiscated by the government as punishment for rebellion or failure to pay taxes. As land was often the only form of wealth landlords had, the threat of government confiscation was an instrument of control as well as a source of revenue for the state. The khāliṣah were usually rented out on long-term leases or were granted as ṭuyul, that is in lieu of services rendered or salaries deferred. The khāliṣah were also in some instances farmed directly by the government. These lands were cultivated by peasants under conditions similar to those of the arbābī lands. They were scattered throughout the country and were also subject to various local and regional variations in agricultural taxes.

In several Middle Eastern countries, bedouin law, which exists only in an oral tradition, is today applied alongsidethe increasingly used shariʿa and civil law. Jurisdiction among these three judicial systems is compartmentalized, but sometimes categorizing of individual cases is difficult. Bedouin law also differs considerably from one region to another. The bedouin in this study belong to the ʿArab alʿAzazme, the tribe that inhabits the area stretching from Beer-Sheba (Israel) southward. My acquaintance with the southern tribes in the Sde Boqer vicinity dates from 1980. I recorded the first case in 1982, and the second, which helped me substantiate the first, in autumn 1987.

Over the past century, most states of the Middle East have attempted to strengthen and centralize their legal systems, often following European models. Egypt undertook one of the first steps in that direction with its mixed-court system. These courts, which had jurisdiction in civil and commercial cases that involved a foreigner, however remotely, operated from 1876 until 1949. That this system could survive the political turmoil of those years, far outliving the circumstances which brought it into being, is remarkable.

The Ottomans, after a long period of peace that began in 1740, declared war on Russia in 1768, disputing territory essential to the continued existence of the empire: Moldavia, Wallachia, the Crimea, and Georgia. The war lasted until 1774, during which time the Ottomans proved that they no longer posed a military threat to Europe. The signing of the Küçük Kaynarca treaty of 1774, which granted Tatar independence in the Crimea, was the first instance of an Ottoman cession of a predominantly Muslim territory to a European power, and it provoked an internal crisis and long debate over the future of the empire. The Ottoman administration, especially the scribal bureaucracy, contributed a number of political advice manuals to the debate, which form the core of the following discussion. Four examples have been selected with the purpose of extending the analysis of Ottoman advice literature into the 18th century and testing the assumption of Ottoman inability to accommodate changing political realities.

In his seminal and pioneering work, al-Risāla, al-Shafiʿi, the founder of juridical uṣul al-fiqh, laid down the following maxim:

God has obliged us to follow everything the Prophet instituted (sanna). And He has rendered adherence to this obedience to Him and turning away from it disobedience [to Him] for which He excuses no one.

Since the 1950s Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East has centered on the question of support for the Arab position on the Palestinian question. Ever since the U.N. General Assembly resolution of November 1947 that partitioned Palestine between the Palestinians and Israelis, all the Arab countries—even though diversity of regime has prevented them from otherwise acting as a unit in Middle Eastern politics—have consistently supported the establishment of an independent Palestinian state (in opposition to the Israelis and the United States) as a condition for stability in the Middle East. In November 1973, the heads of the Arab states declared the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—created in 1964 through the initiative of the Arab League—to be the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and they have supported its efforts to establish an independent Palestinian state in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip ever since.