In most studies of the early twentieth-century emergence of a modern conception of law in America, the formation of the American Law Institute in 1923 is not highlighted. One might point to academic literature advocating a “sociological” approach to judicial decision making, or a behavioralist approach to the work of judges, or the reorganization of law school casebooks to include “functional” legal categories or social science materials. One might unpack the work of an early twentieth-century lawyer, or even a judge, and find a jurisprudential perspective that could be labeled modernist. Finally, one might note the appearance of litigation strategies—encapsulated in the term “Brandeis brief”—designed to incorporate into case decisions arguments that legal rules should reflect their social context. But one would not associate the arrival of modernist jurisprudence in America with the early history of an organization of elite lawyers and judges whose stated purpose was to commission “restatements” of black-letter common law rules.

Two of the most significant factors in the development of European nation states are the enforcement of the law and the political relationship between central government and the provinces. The establishment of powerful national institutions in the Middle Ages, the successful incorporation of its geographical fringes, and the involvement of local elites in implementing national law and policies have made England a challenging subject to test this interaction between the center and the localities. Although this relationship could never be free of tensions, reflection on the context of the English Civil War has suggested a new interpretation. Pursuing the inquiries initiated by the so-called “gentry controversy” in the 1950s and 1960s, a group of historians has studied individual counties and argued that, for local aristocrats and gentlemen, provincial values and issues took precedence over national policies. The Civil War, in their view, appeared to be a conflict between an increasingly interventionist and “nationalizing” central government and semiautonomous shires.

Ever since the official promulgation of the judicial reform statutes of 1864 in late imperial Russia, a scholarly commonplace has been the reform's contribution to the remarkable emergence of several generations of brilliant Russian trial lawyers and an internationally famous tradition of outstanding judicial oratory during the half-century preceding the Bolshevik revolution. This impressive display of judicial learning and courtroom artistry occurred in the context of Western-style trial by jury, the reform's most daring innovation. Introduced in 1866 after two years of energetic preparation, Russia's system of trial by jury bequeathed to scholars the most powerful emblem of the post-1864 Russian legal order: the courtroom confrontation between the defense attorney (zashchitnik) and the state's prosecutorial agent, the procurator (prokuror). In this judicial clash, the defense counsel has represented the eloquent, keen-witted, Western-educated champion of the individual and even the “defender of public interests.” The procuratorial representative has come to embody the interests of a regime whose relentless and often undisguised statism belied the reform statutes' open proclamation of the principles of legality and the “rule of law.”

Over the last decade special attention has been accorded to the development of the trial jury. Historians have examined, within the context of the administration of justice and across a broad chronological span, the shifting character of English juries. Thomas Green himself has contributed much to our understanding of medieval jury behavior by synthesizing his own and existing research to form a useful working hypothesis and by highlighting in particular the practice of jury nullification. Yet there are still areas, particularly in the medieval period, that lack adequate definition and would benefit from the close attention afforded by more specific studies ranging over a limited time frame.