Although largely neglected in the literature, Benjamin Constant was one of Rousseau's most powerful and subtle nineteenth-century critics. In the first part of this essay, I have revived Constant's criticism of Rousseau's conception of freedom and tyranny. In the second part, I have provided counterfactual evidence in an attempt to show how Rousseau would have responded to Constant's interpretation. By demonstrating both Constant's criticism and Rousseau's defense, I have depicted the relationship between these two thinkers as a dialogue — a dialogue on the meaning of freedom and tyranny.

The political covenant in Hobbes's Leviathan involves “more than consent, or concord; it is a real unity … made by covenant of every man with every man.” But is it possible for essentially separate individuals to merge their identity with the sovereign power and, if so, how? It is possible, initially, because each man shares a common desire for peace. However, this desire is “contrary to our natural passions” and is largely ineffectual until, through the device of a political covenant, it acquires the institutional support of the sovereign power. The will to peace is the essence of sovereignty; the establishment of a secure peace is its end. Ideally, the sovereign will operate within the parameters of legitimacy thus established. As a result of the political covenant, man's passions are contained, but the subject also acquires an enhanced ability to order his own actions in accordance with the will to peace.

In order to defend participatory democracy in large-member voluntary organizations, Michels's challenge to traditional democratic theory must be answered. By arguing that the technical, sociological, and psychological processes of modern organizations invariably result in leaders dominating members, Michels questioned democratic theorists' assertions that participation is self-reinforcing and that participation produces popular control. Defending participatory democracy, then, involves showing how the problems of participation and popular control can be overcome in formally representative organizations. The answer proposed is that collective solidarity or community formed by those reacting to injustice and committed to egalitarian social relations provides the motivation for mass participation and the basis for popular control in modern union and party organizations.

Political science is in a state of crisis today. The crisis is the result of the scientistic predicament. Man has become the victim of his own reason and knowledge. Scientific rationality and value-neutral theories of knowledge lead to the eclipse of the public realm and the growth of social regimentation, mass manipulation, large-scale indoctrination and totalitarian domination. As a result, the homo politicus is reduced to the homo faber and the animal laboran. What is required is a radical shift in our intellectual perspective. Phenomenological and linguistic-analytical theories of action are inadequate to provide a sound basis for political science. Philosphia perennis alone can restore to politics its full glory and splendor.