A recent burst of interest in revisionist interpretations of early Islamic and especially Abbasid history may be attributed in large measure to the availability of a number of fresh source materials, one of the most important of which is an anonymous history of the Abbasid family. A number of problems surrounding this work are still far from being satisfactorily resolved, including the questions of its title, the date of its composition, the identity of its author, and its historical and historiographical value.

In viewing American relations with the middle East since the Second World War, scholars have focused on the more dramatic events: Israel's independence in 1948, the Suez affair of 1956, and the post-1967 amalgam of conflicts and diplomacies. This, however, has resulted in a dearth of research on the inter vening periods, particularly the first half of the 1960s, when admittedly American leaders were preoccupied with events and crises elsewhere. Yet this period witnessed a substantive transformation in the American-Israeli relationship, complemented by a revealing twist in American relations with the Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Relying primarliy on recently declassified documents, this paper seeks to explain both the course of American realtions with Israel and Egypt, as well as the reasons for the Middle East's relegation to the sidelines by American foreign policy decisionmakers. More specifically, two developments require explanation: Israel's emergence as an acknowledged ally of the Unisted States and recipient of offensive weapons; and the determination of American decisionmakers to pursue closer realtions wiht Nasser's Egypt despite numerous conflicting interests.

Part 1, (IJMES, 14 [1982], 249–281) presented arguments in favor of the first of two major contentions in respect to the development of Egyptian Arab nationalism between the two world wars; namely, that a rigid dichotomization between an assumed Arab-Islamic orientation of the Palace and a secular-liberal, Egyptian orientation of the Wafd and other parties is false. In the preceding segment I tried to show that in the interwar period both the Wafd and the Palace began to develop Arab nationalist orientations, albeit cautiously, and in a manner that continued to subordinate Arab concerns to the national question more narrowly conceived. I was particularly interested in demonstrating that no new, activist pan-Arab policy could be attributed to the Palace in the late thirties. Part 2 elaborates upon these and other themes as it discusses my second major contention:

The increased interest in Afghanistan, highlighted by the Soviet invasion of that country in December 1979, calls for the reassessment of the more recent political history of Afghanistan, particularly its relations with the great powers. In this connection the period of World War 11 has often been treated superficially, and until today there has been only one book (L. W. Adamec, Afghanistan's Foreign Affairs to the Mid- Twentieth Century: Relations with the USSR, Germany, and Britain [Tucson, 1974]) which contains adequate coverage of the war years. These years ought to be considered as a watershed for the entire region since they clearly foreshadowed the events to come, which we are observing today with great amazement and alarm.

Whatever their underlying causes, social upheavals and revolutions represent violent and often anarchic manifestations of the masses' frustrations and unfulfilled aspirations in the face of nonresponsive despotic rulers with an autocratic and suppressive bureaucratic machinery. Iran's revolution of February 1979 was first and foremost a popular uprising against the dictatorial rule of the Shah. The millions of people who throughout 1978–1979 joined street demonstrations were united in what they wanted to dispose of and whom they were fighting against. Mobilized under the tactical tripartite alliance of the ulama (men of religion), the bazaris (merchants, small traders, and shopkeepers), and the intelligentsia (secular liberal reformists and leftist revolutionaries), the masses were determined to topple the Shah's rule. The demise of the old regime seemed to be the only obstacle to a promising future. Beyond this immediate aim there was, and still is, no agreement as to the root causes of the February revolution and its ultimate objectives.

The history of Ottoman transportation as a whole still remains to be written. To date, scholars have concentrated mainly upon the institutional aspects of the problem. Thus Cengiz Orhonlu in his pioneering work has dealt with attempts on the part of the Ottoman administration to maintain street and road paving, establish ferryboat services, control river navigation, and ensure the safety of public roads. Boat traffic within Istanbul, which linked the different parts of the Ottoman capital and thus ensured their mutual integration, was also treated mainly from the Ottoman administration's point of view.1 After Orhonlu's untimely death, research into the institutional framework supporting Ottoman communications was continued by other scholars. Particularly the arrangements intended to supply official couriers with post-horses have recently been made the object of several monographs.2

Albert Hourani's survey of “The Present State of Islamic and Middle Eastern Historiography” has one obvious lacuna: it fails to mention the author's own (Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939).1 This masterpiece, published in 1962 when its author was forty-seven, has left its mark on a whole generation of English-speaking scholars of the Middle East.

Hisham Sharabi writes: “I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Albert Hourani, whose pioneering work, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1789–1939, is an indispensable reference to any study of modern Arab intellectual history.”2