I. In a recent article in this journal, Allerton (1978) calls into question the status of a transformational rule - usually called Dative Movement - which relates sentences like: (1) (a) Jim gave a present to Margaret. (b) Jim bought a drink for Margaret. to sentences where the prepositions to/for are not present, and where Margaret immediately follows the verb: (2) (a) Jim gave Margaret a present. (b) Jim bought Margaret a drink.

His argument is based in particular on the observation of those construtions involving the preposition for.

I. SOUNDS IN MODERN HEBREW Hebrew shorashim – the triliteral roots – have already been analysed from many points of view, for example in Morgenbrod & Serifi (1976, 1977, 1978). The aim of this article is an examination of the sound structure of shorashim.

In general we can divide the consonants which form the shorashim into two different types; concerning (a) the manner of articulation (e.g. plosives, nasals, etc.); and (b) the place of articulation (e.g. bilabials, labiodentals, etc.).

In this study we have concentrated on position of articulation and ignore manner of articulation.

In Figure I the consonants forming the shorashim are related to the different kinds of sounds according to Wendt (1961).

In order to investigate the relationship between the sounds it is convenient to establish so-called compound matrices with a computer. All computation was done by a program in COBOL running on the SIEMENS System 4004. As material for our analysis we took 2443 shorashim from the sources Barkaly (1972) and Even-Shoshan (1972).

Introduction This article describes aspects of the semantics of Japanese verbs of dress, first from a contrastive standpoint vis-à-vis English, and subsequently in terms of their position within the structure of the vocabulary of Japanese. It is hoped that the treatment may draw attention to the semantic interest of this area of the vocabulary in different languages, and to the importance of a hitherto little-described sense relation of oppositeness.

In a recent article on the indivisibility of ‘words’ (Sampson, 1979), Geoffrey Sampson, in arguing against the semantic decomposition of ‘vocabulary items’, concludes with a claim against lexical decomposability of derived items such as Nixonite, etc. One can hardly take issue, I think, with his argument against the purely semantic decomposition of lexical primes; however, it does not follow from this that the lexicon is characterized by unproductive, irregular rules or a total absence thereof: …it seems factually untrue that rules of derivational morphology (such as the rule for forming nouns in -ite) can be assimilated to semantically regular, productive ‘rules of grammar’ such as the rule for pluralizing nouns; the former rules are typically not fully productive, and the meanings of the words produced are not in general predictable (46).

To avoid the triviality of mere taxonomy in which languages are classified by such arbitrary criteria as ‘is/is not tonal’, ‘does/does not have unbounded movement rules’, ‘has prefixes/suffixes’, etc., language typology needs to be able to make implicational statements of the sort usually associated with the name of Greenberg.1 For instance, one wants to be able to say of a language not only that it is VSO, but also that it THEREFORE will have prepositions, will place modifying adjectives after rather than before the noun, will put titles before proper names, and so on. Likewise, if a language has the word-order SOV, then an interesting typology should allow one to predict that it will ipso facto be postpositional, put attributive adjectives before the noun, etc.

The aim of this paper is to justify the use of syntactic features, to show how they relate to semantic features and how they operate in syntax and morphology. 1 Particular stress is laid on the elimination of redundant features. First we shall review the literature, to show why syntactic features should require justification. Then, as an illustration, we shall investigate the feature of animacy in Russian in all components of the grammar in which it has a rôle.

The study of intonation has gone through phases in which it has been fashionable to ascribe the meaning of intonation to one particular sort of function.1 Most traditionally that function has been grammatical (see, e.g., the earliest British attempts at intonation analysis (e.g. Butler, 1634) and many recent textbooks on English language teaching). More recently (i.e. since the second world war), speakers' attitude has often been taken as most important (e.g. Pike, 1945; Kingdon, 1958). In the light of current fashion, the discourse function is often seen as most important (e.g. Brazil,, 1975, 1978; Pilch, 1977).I argue in this article that intonation operates with its own set of meanings which are of higher abstraction than those of grammar, attitude or discourse; and that it is only at a lower level that these meanings of higher abstraction become relevant to one or more of these functions (in so far as the functions can in any case be clearly separated). Such a hypothesis is relevant to the question of how intonation is acquired by children (where the real problem for investigators has always been WHAT exactly is being acquired). It is also important to questions of cross-dialectal intonational translation (whether across social or regional boundaries) and also to possible intonation universals.

INTRODUCTION In a recent paper, Botha (1976) suggests that the analysis of linguistic argumentation is a ‘non-normal’ thing for linguists to do. ‘Normally’, he maintains, ‘linguists are oriented towards uncovering the nature of human language, and not the nature of linguistic science.’ Botha (1976: 3) even goes so far as to claim that the analysis of a form of argumentation is not a sort of linguistic analysis; it is instead a form of philosophical analysis. Some philosophers would probably disagree here with Botha and say that philosophical analysis is a sort of linguistic analysis. I am thinking here of Wittgenstein, for example, and the so-called philosophers of language who accept the view that the business of philosophy is to deal with the question of how words mean what they mean, etc., rather than to offer a comprehensive theory of the universe. It is difficult to draw a line of demarcation between a discipline proper and the study of the methodological underpinnings of that discipline, which I am not sure is essential anyway. My point is that a certain amount of self-criticism and awareness of the status of theoretical concepts and arguments can do linguists no harm.