More than a decade has elapsed since Robert Axelrod first published his theory of political coalitions. At the time, it represented a significant departure from existing theoretical work by defining as a major component of an actor's utility function a preference to join winning coalitions which minimize the degree of ‘conflict of interest’ among potential partners. Axelrod has defined the degree of conflict of interest in terms of the incompatibility of actor goals (e.g., policy preferences), thus deriving the expectation that forming coalitions will minimize the degree of preference disagreement among their members. Subsequent theoretical research has tended to retain this emphasis upon closely shared preferences among prospective coalition partners.

There is a growing body of literature dealing with the anticipation and management of international crises. However, there has been relatively little attention paid to the learning effects of successive ‘real world’ confrontations between the same protagonists. This gap is somewhat paradoxical, since there is a great emphasis upon ‘teaching’ the adversary certain lessons in the deterrence literature, and a preoccupation with ‘vicarious learning’ by policy makers who do not wish to repeat the mistakes of their predecessors.

The mid-1960s to mid-1970s was a period of unexpected upheaval, ideological ferment, issue polarization and changing of the guard in the United States no less than in West Germany or other European countries. Nearly everywhere politics moved from an era of tranquillity to an era of confrontation. Established political parties were challenged by the salience of new issues and by new forms of political participation. The ability of parties to govern and, at the same time, to prove responsive under these circumstances was put to a severe test. The hold of parties on the mass electorate appeared to be slipping, and the writing of scenarios for partisan realignment and dealignment turned into a cottage industry.

Government budgets have acquired a key role in the activities of policy makers. They have also attracted a great deal of attention from political scientists. Perhaps no other feature of policy making is so completely described and analysed. For both policy makers and political scientists, the budget is the ultimate Scoreboard, showing which agencies, programmes, or groups are getting more or less of what the government has to offer.

It is widely supposed that the level of popular support for governments depends on those governments' success in handling the economy. Some recent studies have attempted to test this idea by estimating the statistical relationship between the government's popularity in the opinion polls and various indicators of the state of the economy such as unemployment rates, inflation rates, growth rates and so on. A general finding of these studies is that popularity is significantly correlated with all these indicators of the standard of living. All of them, however, operate on the assumption that the voters behave as if they had perfect knowledge of the state of the economy as set out for example by the Government Statistical Service. Whether this assumption does, in fact, approximate to the truth will, however, depend in large part on how the popular media present economic trends and economic relationships to their public. If there are gaps and biases in the information which is presented to many voters, then those voters will be responding to a picture of the economy which may differ dramatically from the picture offered by publications such as Economic Trends and the government will be selling its policies in a highly imperfect market. The purpose of this paper is to mount a preliminary investigation into the picture of the economy which has been presented by one important medium of communication, namely mass-circulation newspapers. The aim is to show how firstly the scope and secondly the interpretation of the economic data presented by the popular press developed over the period 1960–80. The limitations of this method should be spelled out. We are not considering all the sources from which people derive information about the economy (personal communications, radio, television, newspapers), but only the last and possibly the most partisan of these. This Note offers, therefore, in no sense ‘the ordinary man in the street's perception of the economy’ but simply the picture of the economy which one influential medium of communication presented.

To make the theory of games plausible as a representation of behaviour – be it economic or political or social – we must introduce some of the sense of structure and continuity that characterizes our actual lives. Real people do not pair up, play a single game and depart, never to meet again. On the contrary, much of life is made up of continuing interactions with the same small cast of characters. And that, in turn, makes some dramatic differences in the way games are played. Making an unsecured loan to an itinerant is obviously out of the question. But if it is someone who has to deal with you over and over again in a variety of contexts, then the future itself can be your hostage.