Postoperative wound infections following open heart cardiac surgery increased markedly after hospital relocation (7 of 77 v; 4 of 320; p = .0007). Of the multiple identified risk factors, significant patient and procedural association included prolonged operative time of infected patients (384 minutes ± 115 SD v 318 ± 67, p = .025) and operation in a room used within the previous 48 hours for a contaminated case (4/7 infected v 10/67 not infected; p = .023). Several defects were discovered in the air handling system. After appropriate changes, the infection rate decreased in the next 12 months (1 of 109; p < .02). Other concurrent surgical wound infection rates remained unchanged suggesting that defective air handling may have impacted only on the open heart cardiac surgery patients. Preceding contaminated surgery and prolonged operative time were associated with postoperative wound infections in cardiac surgery.

During 1981, 39 nosocomial infections occurred in 27 of 223 patients undergoing cardiac surgery in the North Carolina Memorial Hospital. The peak attack rate (23.7%) occurred in August and September compared to 10.1% in January through July. A case-control study demonstrated that the only risk factor common to poor and stable health groups compared to controls was duration of stay in the cardiothoracic intensive care unit (CTICU). Microbiologic studies of the environment, personnel and patients showed that colonization or infection of patients occurred 1 to 6 days after admission to the CTICU and that nosocomial pathogens were found: 1) in and around the unit's soiled utility sink, 2) in pooled handwashing cultures of unit personnel, and 3) on contaminated clean hands and air near the soiled utility sink, plus nearby bedside air only while the water in the sink was running. Environmental and personnel hand contamination by soiled utility sink aerosols likely contributed to these infections. Infection control measures, including discontinued use of the soiled utility sink, resulted in a significantly lower infection rate (5.6%).

To determine the cost of post-exposure prevention of hepatitis B among hospital employees, a 12-month prospective study was conducted in six Phoenix-area hospitals. Data on reported employee accidents which involved exposure to blood and any subsequent medical attention were obtained weekly. Costs were assigned to all tests, treatments, and working time lost. For 518 potential hepatitis B exposures, the mean cost per incident was $92. Costs associated specifically with preventing hepatitis accounted for 80% of the costs. When data on these incidents were applied to a model procedure for handling potential exposures to hepatitis B, the costs increased to $109 per incident. One work-related case of clinical hepatitis B cost the hospital $13,376. A determination of total hospital costs for hepatitis B should include the direct and indirect cost of each employee case of the disease, the costs of routine serologic screening of employees, and the cost of post-exposure strategies.

In Fall 1981, an outbreak of acute infectious conjunctivitis with keratitis (EKC) occurred in patients who had visited a private ophthalmology clinic just prior to onset of illness. Among an estimated 2,200 patient visits to the office from August 10 to October 15, 1981 for problems unrelated to infectious conjunctivitis, 39 (1.8%) persons subsequently developed EKC. The median incubation period was 6.5 days (range, 1 to 14 days). A case-control study was done to identify risk factors associated with contracting EKC; patients with EKC were more likely than control patients to have been examined by one or the other of two of the four ophthalmologists at the clinic and to have undergone procedures such as tonometry or foreign body removal. Adenovirus was isolated from conjunctival swabs from four of five persons with conjunctivitis; three were type 8 and one was type 7. Recognition of the problem and improved handwashing practices were associated with terminating the outbreak. This outbreak illustrates the potential for transmission of adenovirus infection during the provision of eye care. Infection control practitioners should be familiar with measures for the prevention of such infections among ophthalmology patients.

Since the epochal observations of Ignaz Semmelweis in Vienna in 1847 that the hospital personnel are one of the major carriers and transmitters of hospital-acquired infections, and that relatively simple techniques and behavioral standards can prevent it, European physicians and nurses have fluctuated in the degree of importance they have given to hospital infection control.