The pre-colonial Javanese kingdom was an unstatistical sort of state. Naturally it counted soldiers, taxes, wives, concubines and children, but it rarely kept detailed social and economic statistics. Nevertheless, some statistical records survive, largely through being preserved in Dutch East India Company (VOC) archives. Comparison and analysis of these, plus one or two leaps of imagination, enable one to build some historical hypotheses upon these materials and thereby to illuminate something of Javanese social history after the mid-seventeenth century and particularly in the eighteenth century. For the period from the mid-eighteenth century to 1812, important demographic and economic data relating to the kingdom of Yogyakarta alone will be made available in a forthcoming volume edited by Dr P. B. R. Carey and to be published by the British Academy.

By an edict of 15 February 1805 the Governor-General ordered the Chinese moneylenders from the town of Buitenzorg to report to the Commissioner of Native Affairs how much money the inhabitants of the Buitenzorg Regency owed them. Non-compliance with this order would result in cancellation of the debts. The Commissioner compiled a list, based on these reports, dated 30 June 1805. In 45 pages, consisting of 672 entries, the debtors of and debts to 26 Chinese are listed. The debtors and debts are listed under their creditor, the Chinese moneylender. The entries are probably given as they were reported by the Chinese themselves, although there is no logic in the ordering of the names. An ‘ideal’ entry yields the following data: name of moneylender, name of debtor, his place of residence, year that the debt was incurred, amount of money borrowed with sawahs (wet rice fields) as collateral, number of pétak (embanked ricefield) sawah, amount borrowed with buffaloes as a collateral, number of buffaloes, amount of cash borrowed (without securities), amount of credit for merchandise, amount of annual interest, number of years paid, number of years still to be paid.

Students of Javanese society have long recognized that the Java War (1825–30), the bitter five-year struggle against European colonial rule in Java, constituted a watershed in the history of modern Indonesia. In his recent textbook, Professor Ricklefs has characterized the year 1830 as ‘the beginning of the truly colonial period in Java’, arguing that the Java War marked the transition point between the ‘trading’ era of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and the years of ‘colonial’ exploitation ushered in by Johannes van den Bosch's well known ‘cultivation systems’. In military and political terms, the costly Dutch victory over the javanese made them, for the first time in their three and a half centuries of involvement in the archipelago, the undisputed masters of Java. At the same time, scholars of Javanese Islam have suggested that the defeat of the Javanese leader, Dipanagara (1785–1855), and the religious ideals for which he fought (most notably his goal of strengthening the institutional position of Islam in Javanese society), temporarily undermined the morale and self-confidence of the Islamic communities in Java. Specialists in the history of the central Javanese principalities (vorstenlanden), especially those interested in cultural developments, have also seen the Javanese failure in 1825–30 as a setback to the vitality and independence of the Javanese cultural tradition, a time when Javanese society began to turn in on itself and lose something of its strength and flexibility.

The Cultivation System, introduced by the Dutch in Java in 1830, was grounded on peasant coercion. Capitalizing on the colonial government's ability to force peasants to produce large, cheap and regular quantities of tropical agricultural goods and to labour unrelentingly at a great variety of other tasks, the System succeeded in its aim of transforming Java from a financial millstone around Holland's neck into a highly profitable resource. Coercion, in the eyes of the Cultivation System's founder and guiding light, Governor-General Johannes van den Bosch (1830–33), was the most appropriate and effective means of creating wealth from Java's peasant masses. The power of incentive alone, he argued, had failed in the recent past to spur the Javanese to greater productive activity because the peasant had not reached the required stage of social development. ‘Never forget’, he remarked in 1830, ‘that the javan has progressed no further in intellectual terms than our children of 12 or 13 years old, and possesses even much less knowledge than they do. They must be led and governed as children…’. Van den Bosch's branch of coercion, however, was not a blunt instrument. It was based upon the time-worn notion of domesticating the indigenous elite and employing its customary authority over the peasantry to achieve Dutch ends. Under the overall direction of the colonial authorities and their officials, then, peasants were to be ‘led and governed’ by their own leaders, for whom, Van den Bosch claimed, they possessed a ‘childlike respect’.

The choice of the word ‘perspective’ in the title of this lecture exploits the ambiguity to which the English language so happily lends itself. For the lecture will, on the one hand, look back over the valley of the years at the research project on technology and agrarian change in two rice-growing areas, one in Sri Lanka and the other in Tamil Nadu, which was organized from the Centre of South Asian Studies, University of Cambridgejust over ten years ago, remembering some of its findings (see Farmer, 1977) and discussing certain further changes that have taken place in the study area and elsewhere in South Asia in those ten years. The project, it should be said, was inter-disciplinary; involved both sample surveys and studies in depth; and can claim to have attained the fruitful relationship between disciplines and between techniques of field study that some have described as ‘hard to achieve’ (e.g., Hoben and Timberg, 1980).