The world of Southeast Asian scholarship has suffered an immeasurable loss with the death in October 1969 of Professor George Coedès, the undisputed doyen of those who have studied the early history of the region. In a lifetime of scholarly activity, beginning with the publication of his first article on the early history of Cambodia in 1904, Professor Coedès prepared a rich heritage for those who seek to understand the intricacies of the history and culture of the Indianised states of Southeast Asia.

“Malaysia needs this kind of spirit.” With these words, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman, responded to a student demonstration supporting the nation against the 1968 territorial claims to Sabah put forth by the Philippines. Although he toned down his enthusiasm somewhat when later he learned that the same students had forced their way into the Philippine Embassy compound and had torn down its flag prior to their demonstration in front of his residence, there is no denying that this was another example of political change in Malaysia which is causing its leaders to come to grips with a comparatively new phenomena, students as participants in the political process.

Rubber, derived from the latex of the tree Heva brasiliensis, has from the First World War been the economic mainstay of the Malayan peninsula. Not only has rubber constituted Malaya's leading economic sector, but from 1914 down to the outbreak of war in Southeast Asia (with the two marginal exceptions of 1939 and 1941) Malaya was the world's largest single supplier of natural rubber. The revival of Malayan rubber was therefore of prime significance not only for the economic rehabilitation of Malaya but also for the global recovery of rubber consuming industries.

When Penang, Malacca and Singapore were united to form the Presidency of the Straits Settlements in 1826, the police forces in all three stations were small and inadequate. Until 1857 none of the Straits Settlements had a full-time Commissioner of Police, and the Resident Councillors presided over police work, in addition to their duties as head of the executive government and judge in the Recorder's court in their respective settlements.

During the 1930s Japanese business interests increasingly believed that if and when free trade or preferential trade between the United States and the Philippines were to be terminated Japan would necessarily profit by taking over a greater share of the Philippine market. Such anticipation was particularly stimulated after the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act and the establishment on November 15, 1935 of the Philippine Commonwealth which was to be the transitional form of government until full independence was granted on July 4, 1946. Thus the pace of Japanese commercial activity in the Islands accelerated significantly, and Japan's economic stake expanded accordingly. The skills, the business acumen and the unstinting diligence of the Japanese all served to provide them with financial rewards from the Philippine economy. Aggressive tactics, superior organization and sufficient capital also sustained and enhanced Japanese commercial success. All of these factors were evident in the chronology of the development of a Japanese stake in the brewing of Philippine beer.

The facts and evaluations presented here were designed to outline some of the characteristics of the Burmese class-structure. Of particular relevance seems to be the occupational structure and its modification during the last three or four decades. The income distribution among various occupational groups also helped in this characterization. The differentiation and cooperation between the different elites was described, together with the setting in which they function, the qualification for admission and the patterns of mobility comparing the standard of aspirations with the channels available. In this context roles and status image were discussed including the rough after status components, status symbols and the preferred occupational hierarchy in terms of social prestige. Finally the internal cohesiveness of the social strata in so far as distinct self-conscious entities are concerned was examined.

The material presented may be summed up as follows:

1. The population of Burma was split into two main parts: a small elite concentrated in government administration, party bureaucracy and the military on the one hand, and the peasants, small traders, business and hired labourers on the other hand. In between the two is a very small group of middle-class people and skilled workers.

2. Although the average income level was exceedingly low, at least until 1962, the span between the highest and lowest income categories was rather great.

3. The modern elite was small and though the internal differentiation is slight the antagonism is considerable. Before the coup the main adversary groups (excluding the underground) were administrators, politicians and students. The elite groups enjoyed little autonomy and freedom of action as there was no alternative outlet except the government bureaucracy, the military and an underdeveloped party bureaucracy. The weakness of the legal opposition parties and trade unions, the small number of independent economic organizations made it difficult for oppositional elite to develop and be institutionalized in relatively independent power positions. This had many repercussions on the already limited ability of the political and social centre to cope with economic and political problems.

4. Despite the generally universalistic criteria, for acceptance in the various elite groups, and the not insignificant de facto mobility, channels for such upward mobility were few and restricted to certain sectors of the political and government bureaucracy. This enabled the ruling elite to exert much influence on the chanelling of desirable recruits, but created permanent pressure from unemployed or underemployed high school and university graduates.

5. Leaving the ethnic minorities aside, crystallized class-oriented groups were very rare, and the main criteria for belonging to the few that existed were the type of education received and the amount of exposure to Western culture. This dividing line drawn by these criteria did not coincide entirely with that between town and countryside. There was little difference in this respect between the majority of the urban and the rural population.

Accordingly, Burma's class structure appears to be in a state of extensive flux. It would seem, therefore, that the primary problem is to achieve a more institutionalized differentiation of the sub-elite strata. This would particularly bridge the gap between the elites and the rest of the population and facilitate communication as there would be more “non congruent” status groups capable of serving as intermediaries between the elites and the more sophisticated, differentiated population.

While student movements have only recently become internationally prominent, they have been active political and social forces in many nations for a fairly long period of time. The European nationalist movements of the 19th century had strong student support, and European revolutionary movements, including the German revolutions of 1848 and the Russian revolutionary movements, saw students in instrumental roles. In the developing areas as well students have played an important and sometimes crucial political role. Asian students have a particularly long and active history of political involvement. India, China, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, and other nations have all seen nationalist upsurges in the 19th and 20th centuries in which university students and Western-oriented intellectuals have been active. Many Asian nations, after achieving independence, have seen student and youth movements in opposition or as politically volatile elements in their societies. In a few nations, such as Turkey, South Korea, South Vietnam, and indirectly Indonesia, Pakistan, and Japan, students have caused governments to fall or political crises to take place.

In the past many of us have been accustomed to visualizing developmental analysis as taking an inventory of physical resources, distributing them (or merely imagining them) in different fields of production, and then, according to preconceived ideas of technical coefficients, calculating future output. This might be termed the “skeleton” of economic theory. But the real meat of development lies in the efficiency of implementation of decisions, whether planned or laissez-faire. The efficiency of implementation depends on the quality of entrepreneurship; again, whether in publicly or privately owned establishments. This quality of entrepreneurship is determined by the attitude of management and labour leaders to supervision, morale and workers, breakdowns in machinery, commercial risks, and all uncertainties which cannot be effectively programmed. We believe it is taking an inadequate and misleading view of economic development to regard technical coefficients as reliable indicators of the fruitfulness of investments. For instance, a $10 million investment in steel in China might have quite a different impact on a range of economic indicators than the same investment in India.

Despite the amount of commentary generated by the September 30th Movement in Indonesia, agreement beyond simple details of chronology may never be possible. The grisly drama began with the murder of six top army officers and a similar fate soon befell key leaders of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The PKI's surviving remnant split into pro-Peking and pro-Moscow factions each apparently more interested in sectarian wrangling than an objective assessment of their common debacle. Nor can one expect the army to provide an impartial analysis. The legitimization of its new political role required placing the Gestapu albatross firmly around the PKI's neck. And perhaps the best stamp of army success in that endeavour is the almost reflexive resort by commentators to the label “abortive Communist coup”. But this does not imply that the prevailing perception of Gestapu as a failed Communist plot is prime facie discredited because of its serviceability to Indonesia's present leadership. The army-cum-official version surely would not have gained such wide currency without something in its favour. It is the hope of the present article that additional light may be shed on this “something” through a comparative discussion of some representative views regarding Gestapu.