Recurring and fundamental questions about policy-making in the United States focus on Congress' ability to initiate legislation. Does Congress lead? How and when? Are conditions changing to enhance or inhibit congressional initiative?

Nearly all commentators on the legislative process see the president's leadership as natural. But many have argued that he has become the dominant or even exclusive initiator of major legislation. House Republican Leader John Rhodes recently wrote that “Congress has served as little more than a glorified echo chamber for the Executive Branch of government—usually content to approve or disaprove [sic], rarely willing to initiate.” Former Senator Mike Monroney asked, “Is Congress still capable of initiating and enacting its own legislative program?”

When the Watergate dam broke, the ensuing flood of revelations about White House activities swept away a fundamental and cherished tenet of the contemporary liberal credo: the faith in the beneficence of the American presidency. Already suspect after John Kennedy's Bay of Pigs fiasco and Lyndon Johnson's Indochina policy, the dogma that “the cure for democracy is leadership,” strong, forceful presidential leadership, sank beneath the waves of Watergate. The lesson seems clear that it is naive to assume that an innate goodness characterizes the presidency. Rather it seems safer to accept the proposition that executive power, unchecked or only loosely restrained, can be used for whatever purposes a particular president seeks to promote.

Within Congress there are a number of forces that push toward decentralization of influence over the substantive legislative product and lack of coordination of the various legislative enterprises that are being conducted simultaneously. Chief among these forces most of the time are the standing committees of the two houses. There are also a few centralizing forces. Chief among these most of the time are the formal party leaders in the House and Senate, especially those of the president's party if the president views himself as a major figure in the legislative process and behaves aggressively in attempting to implement that self-image.

The theme of the second Nixon administration appears to be “Save the Presidency.” It is clear that Mr. Nixon views his best defense against critics to be the claim of a constitutional imperative to defend his office. And, he continually reminds us, it is an obligation to defend not only the Presidency, but the strong Presidency.

Mr. Nixon's attachment to the strong Presidency is more than a protective strategy. It grows out of American practice and recent theory. His language and themes are predictable within our political system. In American national politics, substantive issues and questions of institutional roles are continually entangled.