Political behavior research has delivered less than the “behavioral revolution” seemed originally to promise. A survey of recent work suggests that the reason is not its epistemological premises (which are accepted here) or its methodology, but (1) its unsystematic, atheoretical character and limited range of research topics, and (2) the erroneous conception of human nature on which research rests. Compared with either the established principles of modern biobehavioral science or the conceptions of human problems of earlier political science, political behavior research remains “pre-behavioral.”

To progress beyond this stage, political scientists must recognize and apply the basic knowledge about human behavior provided by the biobehavioral sciences. Two brief examples of such application are given: how ethological knowledge can supply a needed theoretical perspective for identifying political behavior problems worth studying; and how neurophysiological knowledge, particularly psychophysiology and psychophysics, can correct mistaken conceptions of the relationship between political attitudes, political words, and political actions.

Between 1956 and 1960, the first long-term panel study of the American electorate was carried out at the University of Michigan. Among other findings from this original panel were sharp contrasts between the high individual-level stability of party identification and more labile individual preferences on major political issues of the day. Since 1960, several changes in the nature of the American electoral response have caught the attention of scholars, including an erosion of party loyalties on one hand and an increasing crystallization of issue attitudes on the other. Completion of a new panel segment, 1972–76, makes it possible to review the original 1956–60 findings in the light of these intervening changes. We discovered that the contrasts in individual-level continuity of party and issue positions remain nearly identical to those estimated for 1956–60. The theoretical significance of these counter-intuitive results is discussed.

The measurement technique most commonly used by political scientists for determining the direction and intensity of opinion is category scaling–a procedure with serious weaknesses. Recent developments in psychophysics for the magnitude scaling and validation of sensory eontinua offer a powerful alternative to category scaling. Paralleling explicitly the logic and procedures used to scale psychophysically such variables as the loudness of sound and brightness of light, research methods now make it possible and feasible via a simple paper and pencil technique to obtain accurate, precise, cross-modally valid, magnitude measures of the direction and strength of political opinion from respondents in a survey setting.

A field survey, pitting category against magnitude measures for a sampling of the most important items employed in the SRC/CPS national election studies, demonstrates that the category scaling of political variables results in (1) the loss of significant portions of information and on occasion (2) the misclassification of respondents. The results of this scale-confrontation study demonstrate the superior utility of magnitude over category scaling for the description and quantitative analysis of political judgments and preferences.

This study combines survey data from the 1974 American National Election Study with the front-page content of 94 newspapers in an investigation of the relationship between the degree of negative political criticism found in newspapers and their readers' feelings of trust in government and a sense of their own political effectiveness. Although newspaper reporting was primarily neutral or positive, readers of highly critical papers were more distrustful of government; but the impact of criticism on the more stable attitude of political efficacy was modest. Level of exposure to national news interacted with critical news content primarily to affect feelings of trust, and not efficacy.

This article posits a structural explanation of inefficacy as a result of accumulating distrust, where policy dissatisfaction, rather than dislike of incumbent leaders, acts as the main determinant of cynicism. In this model, media criticism serves as a “mediator” of political realities which eventually, although indirectly, affects political malaise.

This study undertakes a major reanalysis of the decision-making processes in eight committees of the U.S. House of Representatives–Agriculture, Education and Labor, Interior and Insular Affairs, International Relations, Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Post Office and Civil Service, Public Works and Ways and Means. While past studies have relied mainly on interviews, this study uses a data base composed of recorded committee roll-call votes. The analysis consists of a Q-component analysis to determine voting blocs or factions; an R-component analysis to discover issue dimensions; and step-wise regression and correlation utilizing demographic, political and electoral characteristics to define the nature of the voting blocs. The results are then compared with previous analyses of the same eight committees to determine what changes, if any, have occurred since the committees were last analyzed. The findings suggest that partisanship and ideology have become stronger influences on committee decision making than previously noted.

This article challenges some of the conclusions drawn in “The J-Curve Theory and the Black Urban Riots,” by Abraham Miller, Louis Bolce and Mark Halligan (1977). Miller et al. reject relative deprivation theory and J-curve theory as valid explanations of black urban rioting. In my argument that Miller et al. are not justified in rejecting relative deprivation theory, I shall review four versions of relative deprivation theory to show how Miller et al. misrepresent the theory and to point out methodological problems with their operationalization of theoretical variables. Because these operationalization problems are far from atypical, I conclude with a call for greater methodological rigor.

This article has two purposes. The first is to show how some of the central principles of classical Greek political theory became anachronistic as a result of massive transformations in the underlying structure of European society. These principles, it is argued, were originally dependent on an empirical premise that the polity is a “whole” encompassing individual “parts,” or (stated differently) that the polity is identical with total society. This whole/part schematization of the polity seemed plausible in the ancient city since most sectors of polis life had political connotations or overtones. The same schema, however, became an archaism in modern Europe, chiefly because of the emphatic emergence of a distinction between state and society–one aspect of a more general increase in the structural differentiation of society. The second and closely related purpose is to explore the feasibility of a claim once advanced by Benjamin Constant: that the organizational transformations involved in the modernization of European society have created a novel rhetorical opportunity, the possibility of defending tyranny in the name of freedom and democracy.

Historians of political thought have failed to appreciate the importance of Montaigne's Essays as a major work of modern political philosophy. The neglect of the Essays as a political book is traceable to a widespread belief that Montaigne's thought is too fluctuating and unsystematic to embody a coherent and profound political teaching.

This study challenges the prevailing interpretation of Montaigne's thought by analyzing his critique of the classical understanding of supreme or “heroic” moral virtue, concentrating especially on the chapter entitled “Of Cruelty.” A careful reading of this chapter reveals that underlying the seeming disunity or inconsistency of its argument is a carefully worked out political intention. The essence of Montaigne's political project involves the replacement of a traditional morality based on “beauty” (i.e., one in which humanity aspires to share in the divine) by one embodying “utility” (one in which we understand our needs in the light of what we share with the beasts). The analysis of this “transvaluation of values” helps one to comprehend the foundations of the “bourgeois” morality that characterizes modern liberal regimes.

Since the language of political inquiry seems to be inescapably metaphorical, the question necessarily arises as to how metaphors of various types, including models, enter into the composition and expression of political knowledge. The solutions that have been most influential in contemporary political science can be called the verificationist and constitutivist views of political metaphor. While both views contain important elements of truth, there are fundamental difficulties in each that require the search for a more satisfactory view. An alternative view of metaphor and political knowledge is developed by reference to four main problems: Why is political speech metaphorical? How do metaphors make political things manifest? How are political metaphors tested? and Are metaphors indispensable to political expression and political knowledge?

This analysis discusses the implications of some cognitive and organizational factors for the evaluation and avoidance of failures in strategic warning. It advances three major arguments. First, efforts to assess and improve warning forecasts must take into account the policy context in which they are made and used. They cannot be based on concerns with the accuracy of forecasts alone. Second, important biases are present in retrospective case studies. Therefore, we should accept post hoc explanations of warning failures with appropriate caution. Third, a pluralistic intelligence community, as it is presently proposed for some non-U.S. systems, is unlikely to resolve the problems thought to be responsible for past strategic surprises. It may in fact compound these problems.