Similar to many previous and contemporary Islamic states, the basis of classical Ottoman administration and military was a highly elaborate system of slavery. Slaves, carefully recruited and educated, made up the bulk of the central army and filled many of the administrative posts of the empire. To the traditional sources of slaves the Ottomans added a new one: the levy of children from non- urban, mostly Christian subjects of the empire (devşirme). The motive behind this elaborate system of ‘slaves of the sultan’ is obvious: to provide the sultan and the central government with an efficient, well-trained and loyal professional army. The basis of the loyalty was that theoretically they were without root and without ties.

The field of education, its various components and means of putting it into effect, have not received the attention of those who have studied the history of Arabic thought. It has been only recently that Arab education has received the attention of scholars. But thus far, research has been limited mostly to histories of educational institutions and to certain fragmentary aspects of education. Theories of education, or of areas within the field of education, have not been examined.

The relationship between religion and entrepreneurial activity has been an ongoing subject of sociological interest since Weber (1958) first identified the association between Protestantism and the rise of capitalism in Western Europe. One recent collection of papers on the subject (Eisenstadt, 1968) indicates that the topic remains highly controversial, and that the debate moves in two general directions. Some analysts challenge (or support) the factual and/or theoretical validity of Weber's analysis as it applies to Western Europe, or to Protestantism (Green, 1959). Another branch of research attempts to apply the idea on a different level, finding other religious groups for which the theory is valid, in other parts of the world. Most such studies have been made in East and Southeast Asia, but there is a scattering of articles on other countries as well (Eisenstadt, 1968). Bellah (1963) cites several studies of merchant groups in Asia which conform to the Protestant ethic pattern, but points out that they seldom transform the norms of the whole society as Protestantism did in parts of Europe. Their impact is limited to a subgroup within society. These studies suggest that the Weberian thesis might apply on an intra-societal level in cultures different from Europe. The present study attempts to support this idea by positing a relationship between religious ethic and capitalism among a group of merchants in Tunisia who are members of a distinct religious sect within Islam.

Max Weber's brief remarks on the nature of the Muslim city constitute a poignant example of what Bernard Lewis describes as the unfortunate division of labor which has pervaded the study of Islam: the ‘founding fathers’ of sociology and their successors have framed theoretical statements which were either elaborated or refuted by scholars more directly concerned with the Muslim world.

Israeli political, economic, and social achievements have apparently made Israel a developed nation. Social scientists customarily ignore its geographic setting in the developing world and study the country as a phenomenon of political, social and economic development. One aspect, however, is still problematic and controversial. This is the administrative. Israelis doubt the extent to which their governmental administration is developed, by which they mean the extent to which their administration is staffed by trained officials appointed on grounds of merit. While the forms of a modern government service exist, Israelis are skeptical of their substance, because of what they suspect to be widespread instances of inattention to the rules for appointment and promotion to civil service positions. Social scientists seem to have accepted the conventional wisdom of Israeli public opinion and they, too, have judged the Israeli civil service to be embryonic or stunted in development, largely because of political interference in appointments and advancement to senior positions. It is true that in every country the issue of which governmental offices should be political and which administrative is a problem. But this problem is exacerbated in Israel where, because of party politics, it is, ostensibly, one resolution which exists in law and another in fact.

Towards the end of World War II, when the French had regained control of the Levant, revived fears of Hashemite expansion in that area gripped the Free French. The Hashemite rulers of Iraq and Jordan were seen as subversive forces which were constantly attempting to destroy any French influence left in the Middle East, replacing independent states with Hashemite satellites. Eventually, if not counteracted, the whole Middle East would come under their control, and, as the British were behind them, the latter would have once again outmaneuvered their rivals.

Prior to 1964 the Iranian budgets were only a simple record of the receipts and expenditures of the central government. Such conventional administrative budgets were the results of the reforms of A.D. 1911 (21 Safar 1329 A.H.D.) when a Comprehensive Financial Law for the country was legislated. This law was modeled on the existing laws of France. The French laws were in turn based on the philosophy of government as conceived by the classical economists. These economists thought of the governments as an organization which protected the right of the individual to pursue his best interest without trespassing on the rights of others. Also, they advocated government non-intervention and non participation in economic activities.

And as it often happens in Iraq in times of internal turbulence, a general wave of looting swept the north. Assyrian villages were looted by Kurdish and Arab tribesmen and by neighbouring villages, with the Yezidis joining the Kurds and Arabs in this general free-for-all. Sixty Assyrian villages, according to Stafford, were looted in this way and completely or partially destroyed, resulting in a total estimated loss to the Assyrians of at least £50,000. Stafford, however, also records that there was not a single act of aggression against any Assyrian village until 8 August, even the defenceless villages of the men who had gone to Syria with Yaqu not being touched before this date.1 Still, some of the acts committed by the Iraqis subsequent to the attack on them and to their discovery of the atrocities committed by the Assyrians are nothing but black and terrible. But even these were to pale beside what was to happen at Summayl.