It is generally recognized that modern knowledge of the functioning of Chinese society is radically imperfect, and that this is increasingly the case as the topic of discussion is the more limited in locality and the more confined to the domestic details of native Chinese civilization. As the study of the complexities and subtleties of local social and economic organization in our own cities and countrysides has grown and developed, together with that of many other parts of the world with infinitely shorter histories and weaker societies than those of China, students of China have become increasingly aware of the great gulf which resides between what it would be satisfying to know about the China of the past (and the present), and the little which is known in detail, and with any degree of certainty, about these topics.

After the Taiping Rebellion, Governors-General and Governors had access to resources and performed functions which were formerly outside their purview. These resources were mainly the new provincial armies which had defeated the Taipings, and the likin taxes which had been invented to sustain the armies. Leading provincial officials such as Li Hung-chang also found themselves initiating and implementing, on a local basis, ‘self-strengthening’ economic projects ranging from arsenals to mines. They tended to be stationed longer in the same posts, and to have a certain amount of say in the appointment of their subordinates.

An incidental aside in one of my books has become the focal point of a small controversy. Experiment with Freedom, India and Pakistan 1947 was a brief work which attempted to give a more precise and particular account of the events which led up to the transfer of power. Most attention has been paid to my interpretation of the celebrated episode at Simla in May 1947 when Nehru reacted violently to Mountbatten's plans for transferring power. I suggested that the crisis was not an external confrontation between British and Indian views over whether India should remain united, or be divided, or split into fractions, but was essentially an internal crisis in the mind of Jawaharlal Nehru. To try to explain why Nehru was so upset by a plan which he had, in all essentials, previously (however reluctantly) accepted, I made a comparison with his later reaction to Chinese activities on the Indian border. Nobody adopted the slogan Hindi-Chini-Bhai-Bhai (‘Indians and Chinese are Brothers’) more ardently than Nehru and so the revelation that they were enemies came as a profound personal shock. Speaking on the morrow of the Chinese invasion, Nehru said that he now realized that they had been ‘out of touch with reality’, in an ‘artificial atmosphere of our own creation’. The Times printed this observation under the sardonic heading ‘The Dreamers’ (26 October 1962). I suggested that at Simla Nehru exhibited ‘much the same apparent amnesia’.

The north-east frontier of India has today become a controversial issue between India and China. It is well known that this frontier is inhabited by many tribes. They are different from the plainsmen of Assam and, like the Tibetans, Mongoloid in origin. This has led some people to argue that they are far closer to Tibetans than to Indians, or that they are not Indian in any sense of the word. Such arguments are based on the assumption that the people of India do not include people of Mongoloid origin. But there are many Indians who are Mongoloid, especially those who live in the hills of Assam south of the Brahmaputra. And in such important respects as religion, dress and methods of building, the people of the north-east frontier of India are far closer to the hilimen living south of the Brahmaputra than to Tibetans. On ethnic grounds therefore it cannot be said that this frontier area is a part of Tibet rather than of India.