I'm honored by this assignment: partly because I think after-dinner speeches are a necessary combination of regularizer and tranquilizer; also because it is a pleasure to share in our silver jubilee before silver vanishes from circulation. I wonder what the Association will do when the golden jubilee comes round. But the last two words of the title were not of my choosing, and when the program came I had to consult my dictionary. There I learned that “to evaluate” means “to ascertain the numerical value of”—which suggests I am to talk in digits. As for “reflective,” the good book says “throwing back images, light, etc., as in a mirror.” Of late years, since I gave up using a hairbrush and took to an electric razor, I haven't done much looking into mirrors; and when I do so my bifocals compel me to stand so close that the view is limited in area or to move far back and thereby get width and depth of vision.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the various new or current approaches to economic history. In so doing I reluctantly use the now widely accepted terms “new” economic, or “econometric,” history considered by some authors as synonymous. In fact, however, there is both a broader and a narrower application of the phrase “new economic history.” In the broader sense, the term embraces the work of the various authors who have in common as their aim theoretically underpinned quantitative economic history; in the narrower, it refers only to what I shall call the “model builders.” Moreover the terminology seems to be in process of change.

The sterling crisis of 1337–1339 is interesting for two reasons. First, it seems to be the earliest such crisis for which detailed analysis is possible. Second, the details of this crisis, when compared to those pertaining to the 1340's, offer what might be called a “textbook example” of the differences between non-convertible and convertible foreign exchange systems.

Historically, the forms of modern economic life were first extended to new areas from the small zone of Western Europe where they developed by two major means: the direct action of individuals and economic organizations from that zone, and the measures of innovating rulers intent upon modernizing the economic life of their countries. In Russia the outside action came first, beginning with the Chancellor expedition in the sixteenth century and expanding gradually over the subsequent century and a half. Only from the early eighteenth century did the monarch's initiative become the primary factor in economic innovation, but the combination of Muscovite autocratic power and the formidable will of Peter the Great made it from the beginning an irresistible force for change. By the late eighteenth century a new force was evident—the entrepreneurial initiative of Russian tradesmen and manufacturers. The prime movers of Russian economic modernization during the following century were now assembled.

In this paper we shall try to do three things: first, to describe the economic conditions which prevailed before the arrival of Commodore Perry; second, to survey the economic policy of the Shogunate and the Meiji Government in responding to the impact of the opening up of the country; and third, to make a few general comments on some selected aspects of Japan's economic development between 1859, when three Japanese ports were opened to foreign trade, and 1894, when the Sino-Japanese War broke out. The latter date is chosen because it fairly clearly marks off the beginning of the rapid development of the modern sector of the Japanese economy.

American and European economists who work in the least developed countries of Africa, Asia, or the Middle East sometimes come away with the feeling of having learned more than they imparted. Nor is this surprising: the minds of economists are often more receptive to development than are the exotic economies in which they now work. In considering problems of underdevelopment and processes of development we learn—inadvertently, as it were—new things about conventional fields of economics and about the developed economies of Europe and America. These feedbacks have been particularly valuable to economic historians who have given us fresh insights into European, Russian, Japanese, and American development as a direct consequence of the present concern with developing the backward countries. Economic history is now wedded to economic development.

No one seriously questions the familiar association either between levels of urban development and degrees of industrial maturity or between rates of change in these two indices. It has even become commonplace in macroeconomic growth theory to simplify the complexities of structural change into some variation of the urban-rural two-sector model although, in the real world, shifts from commercial to industrial urban employment, let alone more complex intersectoral shifts, are of prime importance. Indeed, many of these growth models place great emphasis not upon changes in sector productivity but upon resource shifts between low- and high-productivity employment, while in empirical studies urban and rural population data very often appear as explicit substitutes for sectoral employment. But given the paucity of macroeconomic data for the antebellum period, especially prior to 1839, one is left puzzled by our relative inattention to the wealth of population census data by residence. American economic history textbooks are stuffed with quantitative information on the number of cities, their spectacular growth, and the percentage of population urbanized, but these may not be the most effective uses of this great data pool. The plethora of urban histories and the abundant attention to urban rivalry may be useful complements, but they are not very effective substitutes for quantitative analysis of overall American urbanization and experience with city size distribution. The very attention which the topic is currently receiving by economists, geographers, and historians suggests that much remains undone in the study of early American urbanization.

Historians have long debated whether the American colonies on balance benefited or were hindered by British imperial regulation. George Bancroft thought the regulations worked a definite hardship on the colonies. George L. Beer believed these regulations nicely balanced and that the colonies shared in the general advantages. Lawrence Harper, in a now classic article, actually attempted to calculate the cost and found that British policies “placed a heavy burden upon the colonies.” Oliver Dickerson wrote that “no case can be made … that such laws were economically oppressive,” while Curtis P. Nettels, writing at the same time to the same point, stated: “British policy as it affected the colonies after 1763 was restrictive, injurious, negative.” It is quite evident that a difference of opinion exists among reputable colonial historians over this important historical issue.

The Maryland Gazette for 18 October 1749 carried an obituary of more than common interest:

On the Eleventh Instant Died, at his Seat on Wye River in Queen Anne's County, Richard Bennett, Esq. in the Eighty-third Year of his Age, generally lamented by all that knew him. As his great fortune enabled him to do much good, so (happily for many) his Inclination was equal to his Ability, to relieve the indigent and distressed, which he did very liberally, without regarding of what Party, Religion or Country, they were. As he was the greatest Trader in this Province, so great Numbers fell in his Debt, and a more merciful Creditor could not be, having never deprived the Widows or Orphans of his Debtors of a Support; and when what the Debtors left, was not sufficient for that purpose, frequently supply'd the deficiency. His long Experience and great Knowledge in Business, as well as his known Candor and generosity, occasion'd many to apply to him for Advice and Assistance, and none were ever disappointed of what was in his Power, and several by his means, extricated out of great Difficulties ….

What is the relationship of economic history to the study of comparative economic systems? Perhaps the major contribution to thought on this subject has been made by Walter Eucken, whose ideas may be taken as the starting point for our discussion.

My thesis examines the process of industrialization in nineteenthcentury New England before the Civil War. I have attempted to achieve three principal objectives: first, the purely descriptive task of beginning to fill our present vacuum of detailed information on the American economy before 1840; second, to test the specific hypothesis that New England and perhaps other American regions would exhibit concentrated spurts of industrial output similar to those which characterized the emergence of modern economies in nineteenth-century Europe; third, to construct an explanation of the forces which determined the particular course of development which was observed.

This dissertation is essentially three distinct writings: the first a statement of hypotheses and findings; the second a bibliography, wherein the content of each source is annotated by an original numeric code system; and the third, an index to the bibliography—the index being entirely computer-produced according to a modified Keyword-in-Context (KWIC) data processing technique.

The central problem of the thesis is the retardation of regional growth. The economy of New Brunswick has provided a case in point for over a hundred years. That is to say, real per capita income within the province has tended to lag behind that achieved in competing regions. This competition has been viewed primarily as a scramble for factors of production. The winners were those areas which attracted factors from lagging sectors whenever income differentials became significant. The losers, in turn, could find in such an exodus a major reason why retardation developed cumulative tendencies.

Any advance in our knowledge about the growth and development of the American colonial economy must first start with a balance-of-payments study. The trade of the thirteen colonies with other areas— principally Great Britain, Ireland, southern Europe, the Wine Islands, the West Indies, and Africa—certainly must have formed, together with the coastal trade between the colonies, a large share of the total market activity. My conclusions from such a study are that the description given of commodity trade by colonial historians has been accurate but that once services as well as goods are considered the picture changes to one where there are only small positive or negative balances remaining on current account for the various regions. As a result, I would conclude that long-term capital flows from Great Britain to the colonies were either small or nil during this period.

The interest of economists in the nature and causes of economic growth has focused attention on demographic phenomena. For the economic historian, this has meant a reexamination of the historically unprecedented international population movements of the nineteenth century and their relationship to the process of economic growth.

The thesis of this essay is that the industrial development of Brazil, 1920–1951, was unbalanced in demand and supply and characterized by input-provision capital formation. Part I introduces an analytical framework. Part II consists of preliminary historical evidence supporting the framework.