Lombardy underwent an agricultural revolution (and a connected process of general economic growth) in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The basis for this transformation was a series of fundamental institutional changes. These latter—consisting most importantly of the transfer of control over the land into new hands—must in turn be attributed essentially to the policies of the Visconti and Sforza dukes who, through direct or indirect means, encouraged, initiated, facilitated, and acquiesced in the processes by which the change took place.

In this paper, which examines the business operations of the Anzin Mining Company during the Restoration, the record of a single firm has been used to assess recent interpretations of the nature of French entrepreneurship in the nineteenth century. These interpretations portray French industry in its formative period developing around “small units, small volume, and small horizons.” “Cautious management, obsolescent plants, and high profits” have been cited as main features which came to characterize the business operations of even the largest firms. It has been pointed out also that maximization of profits was not a fundamental aim of the French entrepreneur, nor did he indulge in the competitive business practices common to American industrial development. In France, security and continuity of the firm were as important to the entrepreneur as profits, and the acquired rights of the small or marginal firm were respected and preserved. The family character of most French enterprises has been emphasized in explanation of these phenomena. Close identification of family name and family honor widi business holdings prescribed a minimizing of risks in the family firm, as well as consideration for the welfare of other family enterprises. Finally, in order to allow these conditions to endure, French entrepreneurs favored a high protective tariff.

In october 1959 a small group of scholars met under the auspices of the University of Chicago's Research Center in Economic Development and Cultural Change to discuss problems of research in Asian economic history. Papers prepared by two participants explored work already done in Indian economic history. It was felt that these two papers might be useful to others, those concerned with Indian economic history and those interested in comparative analysis.

Anyone interested in the historical anlysis of the emergence of a wage labor force in the early stages of industrialization will find much of interest in Rashin's study of the Russian case. The value of this study, an expansion and elaboration of a work published in 1940, lies in both over-all and sector estimates of the growth and composition of the work force, and in detailed data on specific aspects of the movement from the land to the factory.

Lance E. Davis, writing in the March 1960 issue of The Journal of Economic History, found that comparatively low interest rates were paid by eight “Massachusetts-type” cotton textile mills on loans from 1840 to 1860. These firms were voracious borrowers throughout the period, and the textile industry as a whole was a major user of credit. Davis attributed the continued low interest rates primarily to well-enforced usury laws and to the influence of nonprofit lending agencies, with occasional references to effects of the New York money market (not important before 1853). Many other factors—for example, the Tariff of 1846, removing protection from important classes of cotton textiles, die general business cycle, technological changes, alternative investments in railroads and other industries, the relation of increased savings to increased investment demands—should all be explored for an adequate explanation. Of these factors, only the general business cycle is taken up by Davis in a brief reference. The purpose of this note is to suggest that interlocking directorates between financial and textile firms rather than usury laws were probably chiefly responsible for the low rates paid.

Mrs. Vatter has covered three major points in her comment on my article. She has suggested the need for further research; she has questioned the completeness of my analysis of interest rate determination; and she has suggested an alternative explanation of the apparent ceiling on interest charges. I am in complete agreement with Mrs. Vatter on the first of her points. On the second, I apologize for any lack of clarity that may have led her to misinterpret my intent. On the third, I feel that, despite her evidence, her conclusion remains, at best, unproved.