Catholic activity in the United States since our entry into the war has been the subject of much writing. The singular position of Pope Pius XII, the head of the Church, now in the path of the fighting armies in Italy, Catholic opposition to Communism and Fascism, the multiple national origins of the Catholic group, together with the unquestionable generosity of Catholic men and women in the service of the country, have raised some interesting questions about the position of American Catholics on the war. It is too soon to write a definitive account even of what is now history, but the picture of the manifold activity of Catholics in America is an enticing, if difficult, picture to draw.

I Do not have to relate the story of the partitions of Poland, 1772, 1793 and 1795. In two decades Russia took the greatest part of Poland, including in the first place all those now so-called eastern Polish borderlands, which had coexisted with Poland for exactly four centuries. After the Napoleonic War and the Congress of Vienna Russia obtained even more, because to these lands was added the central part of Poland, called the Kingdom of Poland. Poland fought against this domination— in the insurrection of Kosciuszko in 1794, the insurrection of 1830–31, the insurrection of 1863, the revolutionary movements of 1905. These insurrections and these movements produced three results: (l) they maintained and preserved the spirit of independence in the nation; (2) they maintained and preserved in European public opinion the still international character of the political question, of which they became a bloody symbol; (3) they augmented and deepened the Russian oppression. Indeed, most of the cultural achievements that Poland had made were destroyed; on the other hand, nothing was done to continue the natural development of the country, which, just because of that constant arrest of its development, was not able to follow the march of time. The University of Wilno was liquidated; the Lyceum of Krzemieniec was liquidated, and with its wealth the Russians organized their Russian University of Kiev. Museums, libraries, collections of art were confiscated and evacuated. Catholic churches were converted into Russian churches and monasteries.

Territorial disputes are not the only, probably not even the main cause of war, and territorial settlement is not the only and perhaps not the most important aspect of a peace treaty. Still, territorial change after a war is its most conspicuous effect, one which is held in the memory of generations. For two generations of Frenchmen, Alsace-Lorraine was an open wound, a program unifying them much better than any slogan relating to internal affairs. For the generation of Germans which matured after the First World War, the idea of the lost provinces was an intolerable humiliation. During the past few years, similar ideas have become dominant in the minds of the Russians.

As a by-product of the Napoleonic wars the Concert of Europe emerged as the institution responsible for the order of the Continent and even for peaceful change. With the admission of France it was a system of equilibrium founded upon a balance of political power among the five Great Powers which acted in the name of Europe as a unity. The Concert of Europe contained elements that were clearly judicial. It was not at all a mere sociological or political fact. But its juridical elements were weak, obscured by the anti-nationalist and anti-liberal tendencies of the founders. Nevertheless, the Concert of Europe enjoyed more success in solving problems peacefully than did the League of Nations, because the former's responsibility as a pouvoir minoritaire, to use Hauriou's concept, was clear and distinct. It is of course self-evident that the existence and efficiency of the Concert depended upon a community of several interests. It is equally obvious, too, that the Concert grew weaker as more material for political conflict between the Great Powers piled up, and the more their general interest gave way to particular and opposing interests. By the close of the century the Concert of the Great Powers was being slowly rent asunder through the formation of the Triple Alliance and the emergence of the Triple Entente. So it was that Europe ‘stumbled’, as Lloyd George has said, into the war of 1914–18.

Peace-planning is the attempt to invent institutions and to reformulate policies to prevent future wars. Among the numerous ideas on the future organization of the peace, the idea of disarmament has found particularly wide acceptance. In time of peace, there is no need of maintaining armies and armaments on their war time level. Farreaching demobilization is an economic necessity. Consequently, no objections are being raised against the substantial reduction of armaments after the end of hostilities.

Mortimer J. Adler's much quoted address in which he castigated American professors has been Widely misunderstood. When he declared that their errors were more dangerous than the threat from Hitler, he did not intend to discount them. On the contrary, he was paying a most impressive compliment to the importance and effect of their writings and other activities. Adler is professor of the philosophy of law in the University of Chicago, and his yardstick must be applied to himself. It would be inappropriate to pass over his How to Think About War and Peace in silence or to regard it as an unimportant and uninfluential work. This new book, praised as a product of hard thinking, will be read only by few, even though it will be bought by many in response to the intense propaganda of the publisher.