A devastating war crisis is forcing government officials and political scientists to re-examine the efforts of the United States in 1917 and 1918 to adjust a peace-time democratic governmental establishment to the efficient conduct of war activities. That experience, until recently deemed an aberration in American history, is immediately relevant to the current program of national defense. Certain of the vital political problems of the war years are discussed in the following pages for the light which they shed on the present crisis. The discussion centers around the creation and control of emergency agencies for the performance of war functions. A prominent characteristic of governmental behavior was competition for power between the President and Congress, with victory usually in the hands of the President. Closely allied characteristics were the steady growth in the centralization of power as experience in the handling of war preparations was developed, and a progressive decline in the unwillingness of Congress to permit drastic interference with rights of liberty and property. The records show a tremendous amount of initial chaos. Superficially, at least, it seems that the experience of the war years has not yet been absorbed by those now responsible for the conduct of the government and that, whether or not it is necessary, much of the fumbling of 1917 and 1918 is now in process of repetition.

In the World War period and after, the use of extraordinary powers by the executive for legislative purposes became so widespread in Europe that constitutional theorists began to find it convenient to give up the doctrine of legislative supremacy. The constitutional basis for these extraordinary powers has been found in one of two ways: either the parliament may authorize the government to exercise certain legislative functions by way of delegation, or certain provisions in the constitution may be interpreted as giving the executive the right under certain circumstances not only to take specific administrative steps, but also to issue rules of a more general character. In either case, the question invariably arises as to how far the delegation of power may go, or as to the degree to which alleged constitutional emergency provisions may be used to supersede parliamentary legislation.

In France, no constitutional emergency power is provided in the “organic” laws of 1875 which could give a starting point for independent rule-making activity. A law of April 3, 1878, defined very closely the conditions under which a state of siege may be declared and surrounded such a declaration with elaborate provisions for parliamentary supervision. It is apparent that this statute does not allow the government to decree rules of a general character.

Writers on public administration place much emphasis upon the possibilities and importance of discovering and applying scientific principles in their field of study. But very few of them have ventured to state the basic premises upon which they seek to build that science. Many of those whose writings imply that major principles have been discovered announce, not premises, but conclusions, which, regardless of their practical merits, can hardly be called anything but opinions. On the other hand, several scholars seek to escape from errors of commission by avoiding the use of such scientific terms as “principles” or “efficiency.” If they go beyond descriptive analyses to advocate particular plans of organization or methods of procedure, they use terms which denote value judgments, thereby admitting by implication that they are expressing mere opinions. In a few published discourses, basic premises are stated and reasoning is developed therefrom. However, most of those premises—or “principles”—are referred to by name only, such as “the principle of leadership”; they are not stated in terms of precise causal relations which can be verified or which can serve adequately as bases for further reasoning.

It may be regarded as unwise to venture a statement of what one considers the basic premises upon which a science of administration may be built. But every body of theory is built upon fundamental assumptions, either expressed or implied. Moreover, a body of theory is complete, and has scientific value, only when the premises are sufficiently clear to permit objective scrutiny and verification. Erroneous hypotheses, stated precisely, may be more scientific than vague or unexpressed assumptions; for only the former will lend themselves to verification. In other words, trial and error is an essential part of scientific method.

On the most significant aspect of public budgeting, i.e., the allocation of expenditures among different purposes so as to achieve the greatest return, American budgetary literature is singularly arid. Toilers in the budgetary field have busied themselves primarily with the organization and procedure for budget preparation, the forms for the submission of requests for funds, the form of the budget document itself, and like questions. That these things have deserved the consideration given them cannot be denied when the unbelievable resistance to the adoption of the most rudimentary essentials of budgeting is recalled and their unsatisfactory condition in many jurisdictions even now is observed. Nevertheless, the absorption of energies in the establishment of the mechanical foundations for budgeting has diverted attention from the basic budgeting problem (on the expenditure side), namely: On what basis shall it be decided to allocate x dollars to activity A instead of activity B?

Writers on budgeting say little or nothing about the purely economic aspects of public expenditure. “Economics,” says Professor Robbins, “is the science which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.” Whether budgetary behavior is economic or political is open to fruitless debate; nevertheless, the point of view and the mode of thought of the economic theorist are relevant, both in the study of and action concerning public expenditure.

Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the problems of local government in rural areas. Increasing demands upon the taxpayer for the support of government and its services have emphasized the need for modernization of our local political institutions. Although advances in this direction are inevitably slow, each year brings some progressive steps, the cumulative effect of which, over a number of years, should be considerable. In 1939, with most state legislatures in session, numerous statutes were enacted which had as their purpose the readjustment of governmental areas or functions, the improvement of local-government organization or finance, or the promotion of coöperation among various governmental units. At the same time, there were instances in which local units themselves sought, under existing authority, to undertake the performance of new services or to provide their inhabitants with governmental forms or procedures better suited to present-day needs. As in previous years, the developments of 1939 will be summarized under the following headings: (1) areas; (2) organization and personnel; (3) functions; (4) finance; (5) optional charters; and (6) intergovernmental relations.

Modern warfare is waged on at least four fronts through the coördinated efforts of military, economic, diplomatic, and progaganda weapons. Not the least of these is propaganda. Conscious as never before of the catastrophic effect of war upon humankind, the people of a nation must be convinced, before they can be called upon to make the supreme sacrifice, that they are fighting in the name of Truth and Right. It is desirable, therefore, to portray the enemy as a wicked, murderous aggressor, a fit subject for the collective hatred of the state. Once a people become convinced of the blamelessness of their own government and aroused by a spirit of righteous indignation against the enemy, the problem of motivation becomes much easier.

Neutrality versus support of the British Commonwealth was the issue which confronted the Union of South Africa when Great Britain, on September 3, 1939, went to war with Germany. A glance at recent South African political history will assist the reader in understanding the significance of the political crisis which marked the Union's entry into the conflict. As the outcome of an earlier crisis at the end of 1932, when South Africa abandoned the gold standard, a Coalition Government headed by two Boer generals was formed. Genaral Hertzog, leader of the Afrikaans-speaking Nationalist party, who had been prime minister in the preceding Nationalist-Laborite Pact Government, continued in the premiership. The post of deputy prime minister in the Coalition Cabinet was taken by General Smuts, the head of the South African party (made up of both Afrikaans and Englishspeaking elements of the population), which had formed the Opposition to the Pact Government. When this Coalition of 1933 was welded into Fusion by the formation of the United party in 1934, the rô1e of the official Opposition was assumed by the extreme Nationalists under Dr. Malan. Minor parties in Parliament were the Laborites and the Dominion party, an offshoot of the South African party with strong pro-British sentiments.