Among other curious legends about the Balance of Power which were assiduously circulated by German propagandist writers during the war and even before, and have since been repeated in that part of the Socialist press which takes its inspiration from Moscow, I have noticed a tendency which has spread even to reasonable Liberal papers—with a strong pacifist colour—to ascribe the origin and the birth of this doctrine to the machiavellian policy of British statesmen. Many times have I read denunciations of England on the ground that she invented this doctrine, to which are set down the innumerable wars from which Europe has suffered since the sixteenth century.

Now the fact of course is that it is not an English doctrine at all, although it became for quite obvious reasons, which were inevitable, a corner-stone of English policy, unconsciously during the sixteenth, subconsciously during the seventeenth, and consciously during the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, because for England it represented the only plan of preserving her own independence, political and economic. It matters little when the doctrine was actually first formulated—I had doubts about that and, therefore, I confess without shame, having no pretensions to learning, I betook myself to the Encyclopaedia Britannica and there found that it was first given definite shape as a doctrine by Grotius and afterwards became a current part of the equipment of every European statesman.

Few words have been used with more different meanings than the word “law.” “International law” has likewise had many diverse definitions. The term, international law, is here used to cover the rules and principles which are generally observed in the relations among states. As laws in general become serviceable as their observance becomes regular, so international law becomes serviceable as its rules and principles are generally followed.

The modernization of international law would imply the adaptation of international law to modern conditions. Conditions have changed since the old days when “strange air made a man unfree;” when all foreigners were enemies; when emigration was prohibited lest all man-power of a state might leave and there might be no available material for an army; or when such principles generally prevailed as that of Machiavelli, which he enunciates in the following words: “that whoever is the occasion of another's advancement is the cause of his own diminution” (Chap. 3).

The development of the family of nations idea, and its extension from the Christian European states to other so-called Christian states, and later to states having a recognized political standing, regardless of religious or ethnic bases, shows the enlarging aspects of international relationship. In order that this relationship might continue, it was necessary that principles generally recognized by those having control of political affairs as worthy of their support should underlie these relationships.

“I'd give them th' votes,” said Mr. Dooley. “But,” he added significantly, “I'd do the countin'!” These words symbolise, in a crude way, the direction of political inquiry in the century prior to the year 1880. Until about that time political scientists were concerned mainly with the processes of policy and law-making. Incident to this were studied things like the nature of public opinion and the electorate, political parties, representative assemblies and their relation to the executive. But the problem of the civil service in the modern state emerged in its full importance not longer than some four decades ago; and indeed, today, we are only in the stage of discovering the questions yet to be explored.

The centre of gravity in political science has plainly shifted from the field of electioneering to that of the civil service. In our own day that machinery serves two purposes of high importance. Firstly, it furnishes the expert knowledge without which parliaments can not, in any adequate fashion, create and enact policies. Secondly, it carries out the commands of the policymaking body. The experience of the United States, of Great Britain, of France, Germany, Canada, Australia and South Africa, shows conclusively that to perform the first of these two functions the members of the representative assemblies have neither the time, the ability, the inclination, nor the machinery. They must come to the permanent office-holders for expert knowledge. And as to the second, a variety of reasons forces them to legislate in general terms and leave the civil servants to draw up statutory rules and orders—to create “secondary legislation,” the enormous and increasing mass of which gives the civil service in the modern state a vast power.

The relation of the states and the nation is a topic on which there is a good deal of discussion these days. One week last spring brought to my desk four pamphlets on the subject—all of them from an anti-nationalistic point of view, and most of them emanating from the sovereign state of Maryland. At the same time The Times newspaper carried several articles on the subject. One was a rebuke by the President of the present tendency to look toward the national government for everything. A day or two later another utterance from the same distinguished source called for the establishment of a “federal” bureau of recreation.

But, along with this ancient issue, whose infinite variety time has never yet been able to wither or custom to stale, goes another of even broader import.

Like other branches of learning, constitutional interpretation pretends to a certain terminology or jargon of its own, but just how accurate this is, is indeed a question. And if it be inaccurate, this fact furnishes all the more reason why some attempt at defining terms should accompany a consideration of the question of the constitutional relationship of the states and the nation.

The function of the discusser of a paper is, I take it, like that of Antony at the funeral of Caesar: to bury Corwin, not to praise him. Unfortunately Mr. Corwin has been wanting in the good intentions to pave the way for such a sepulchral performance on my part. He has himself recognized the force of the objections which I would urge to the first half of his paper, had that been all of it, and he has made clear that we cannot tell to what extent constitutional theory is a crutch grabbed to help a wayfarer hobble on to his chosen journey's end, and to what extent it is like a flood or a landslide which sweeps a passive person willy-nilly along its own appointed way. Even worse than this, Mr. Corwin confesses that his game is to indoctrinate his hearers with his own preferred brand of constitutional theory. How can one expose a confidence man who takes us all into his confidence like this? If Mr. Corwin's heart were not as hard as his head, he might have shown more sympathy for his commentator and left him a few soft spots where he might dig in with his intellectual toes.

A study of the political events of 1924 in Central and Eastern Europe reveals such a variety of topics lending themselves to extensive treatment that for convenience of treatment, the material has been grouped under the four main heads of (1) financial reconstruction, (2) constitutional, legislative, and administrative developments, (3) parties and politics, and (4) foreign relations.

Although two general elections were held in Germany during 1924, the political situation remained confused. The election of May resulted in gains for both the extreme right and the extreme left; the one of December registered a reaction against both extremes. However, neither of these contests was sufficiently conclusive to indicate clearly the direction in which the currents of public opinion were moving. The result has been a remarkable series of cabinet crises, the latest of which it took more than a month to settle.