Students of the history and working of representative legislative institutions in every part of the world where these institutions are in existence are under indebtedness to Professor Redlich for the thoroughness and completeness with which he has performed a task never before attempted by any historian of the house of commons. In his scholarly book, published in German in 1905, and now more generally available through Mr. Steinthal's admirable translation into English, supplemented by a chapter of twenty-one pages by Sir Courtenay Ilbert, Professor Redlich has traced the history of house of commons procedure from the earliest days down to the important time-economizing changes which were made in the first and second sessions of the parliament elected in January, 1906.

As far as my knowledge goes there are now in existence only two modern books—only two books published since the reform act of 1832—in which any detailed history of parliamentary procedure at Westminster is to be found.

While it has frequently been stated that in framing the Constitution of the United States the federal convention of 1787 was engaged in a very practical piece of work, it never seems to have been realized how completely the members of that convention were dependent upon their own experience. With the Declaration of Independence the colonies organized themselves as States, framing and adopting constitutions. In the course of the Revolution, those States united under the Articles of Confederation. When this latter instrument of government proved to be inadequate, a fresh essay was made and our present Constitution was the result. That the Constitution was framed because of defects in the Articles of Confederation is universally accepted, but it does not seem to be recognized that experience had shown certain specific defects to exist, that the convention was called for the purpose of correcting those specific defects, and that the Constitution embodied in itself little more than the remedies for those defects.

In order to appreciate this point of view, which it is believed is the true historical interpretation of the action of the federal convention in framing our Constitution, it is necessary to divest oneself of preconceived ideas and prejudices due to modern misinterpretation.

The distinction between constitutions and statutes is a fundamental one in American constitutional law, but it is a matter of surprise that no one has yet attempted to discuss this distinction in its historical origins. Brinton Coxe in his Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation has traced the development of the doctrine that statutes in conflict with the constitution may be declared invalid by the courts. Judge J. A. Jameson in his Treatise on Constitutional Conventions has given a brief account of the adoption of the first State constitutions; but no one has yet studied the adoption of these constitutions in order to find what were the theories of their framers as to the distinction between constitutions and statutes.

By the term constitution, as used both in England and America before the Revolution, was understood the general and more permanent principles upon which government is based. The term was used on both sides of the Atlantic to signify something superior to legislative enactments, and the principles of the constitution were appealed to as beyond the control of the British parliament.