The Third International Conference of American States, which was held in Rio de Janeiro in July and August, 1906, differed in some important respects from the two conferences which had preceded it. While it was left to the conferences of Washington and of Mexico City to arrange their own programs and to determine upon their rules and regulations, and while no limit was set to the length of their sessions, all these matters had, in the case of the last conference, been settled beforehand by arrangement of the diplomats representing the American States in Washington who constitute the council of the Bureau of American Republics. A complete program had been worked out, containing all the subjects upon which joint action was considered desirable. A set of rules and regulations also had been adopted and the length of the session had been fixed not to exceed six weeks. The conference when it convened was, therefore, saved all the trouble and loss of time which a discussion of these matters would have made necessary had they been left to the conference itself. As a matter of fact the discussion of these preliminary matters consumed several months at both the conferences of Washington and of Mexico.

Throughout classical and medieval philosophizing runs a theory of a paramount or fundamental law, permanent in kind, because fixed in nature. This theory in its modern form, after voicing itself for a time in the Cromwellian period, came to the front in the American Revolution and found its proper expression in the written constitution. In our federal system, owing to the rigidity of the national Constitution, the development of that document must be traced in the varying decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. In the Commonwealths a more flexible system of amendment prevails, and for that reason changes in what the States consider to be their fundamental law, may be traced more easily in the constitutions themselves, subject as they are to frequent revision and amendment.

In the Revolutionary period these constitutions were few in number, small in size, and contained a mere framework of governmental organization. Since that time some two hundred State constitutions have been made or revised. The forty-five now in force average in length over fifteen thousand words, the longest, that of Louisiana, having about forty-five thousand. In place of fundamentals only, they are filled with details, so petty in many instances, as hardly worthy even to be dignified as statutory.

The right of the people, acting within the bounds of the law and through organs constituted in conformity with the prescriptions of the existing constitution, to alter, amend, or abolish their form of government whenever they deem it necessary to their safety and happiness is, in effect, declared by practically every American bill of rights to be not only fundamental but inalienable and indefeasible. The phraseology differs in some of them but the substance is the same in all. Without such a right the mistakes and errors of the past could not be eliminated from the body politic nor the accumulated wisdom and experience of other States utilized. Without it, the fundamental maxim that constitutions grow instead of being made would be meaningless and political development impossible. An acute thinker has well observed that no constitution can expect to be permanent unless it guarantees progress as well as order. Political conservatism is a virtue too often trampled upon by statesmen, but it has its limits, and, in its exaggerated form, becomes a source of revolution. The amending power has been aptly compared to a safety valve which ought to be so adjusted as not to discharge its peculiar function with too great facility lest it become an escape pipe for party passion and political prejudice, nor with such difficulty that the force needed to induce action will explode the machine.