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Transitional Justice and Victims' Rights before the End of a Conflict: The Unusual Case of Colombia*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 September 2010

JEMIMA GARCÍA-GODOS
Affiliation:
Jemima García-Godos is a post-doctoral research associate at the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, University of Oslo. Email: jemima.garcia-godos@nchr.uio.no.
KNUT ANDREAS O. LID
Affiliation:
Knut Andreas O. Lid is a research fellow at the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights. Email: k.a.o.lid@nchr.uio.no.

Abstract

In a context of continuing armed conflict, a comprehensive scheme of transitional justice has been developed in Colombia since 2005 through the Law of Justice and Peace, with the aim of achieving peace with one of the armed actors in the conflict, the paramilitary groups. The clear link between the demobilisation of illegal armed groups and the rights of the victims is the main feature of the Colombian process. This article provides a systematic review of the implementation of the law, focusing on the institutions, mechanisms and procedures put in place to fulfil its goals. Emphasis is given to the legal category of ‘victim’, victims' rights and victim reparation measures. By exploring how the scheme works in principle and in practice, we are able to assess the prospects for victims' rights in Colombia today.

Abstract

En medio de un contexto de conflicto armado, un complejo esquema de justicia transicional ha sido desarrollado en Colombia desde 2005 a través de la Ley de Justicia y Paz con el fin de alcanzar la paz con uno de los actores armados en el conflicto: los grupos paramilitares. El claro vínculo entre la desmovilización de grupos armados ilegales y los derechos de las víctimas es la principal característica del proceso colombiano. Este artículo provee una revisión sistemática de la implementación de la ley, centrándose en las instituciones, mecanismos y procesos articulados para alcanzar tales metas. Se dá énfasis a la categoría legal de ‘víctima’, los derechos de las víctimas y medidas de reparación. Al explorar cómo funciona el esquema en principios y en práctica, seremos capaces de evaluar las perspectivas de los derechos de las víctimas en Colombia hoy.

Abstract

No contexto de conflito armado contínuo na Colômbia, um programa compreensivo de justiça transitória foi desenvolvido a partir de 2005. A Lei de Justiça e Paz teve como objetivo alcançar a paz com uma das partes armadas no conflito, os grupos paramilitares. A ligação explícita entre a desmobilização de grupos armados ilegais e os direitos das vítimas representa o principal aspecto do processo colombiano. Este artigo oferece uma revisão sistemática da implantação da lei, concentrando-se nas instituições, mecanismos e procedimentos instalados para que as metas fossem atingidas. As categorias legais de ‘vítima’, direitos das vítimas e medidas reparatórias recebem ênfase. Ao explorar o funcionamento do programa em tese e na prática, podemos avaliar as prospectivas das vítimas obterem seus direitos na Colômbia atual.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

1 A comparative analysis of victim reparations programmes in Latin America is beyond the scope of this article, but references will be made to the ongoing Peruvian and Guatemalan experiences to highlight specific issues.

2 Congress of the Republic of Colombia (CRC), Law 975, Por la cual se dictan disposiciones para la reincorporación de miembros de grupos armados organizados al margen de la ley, que contribuyan de manera efectiva a la consecución de la paz nacional y se dictan otras disposiciones para acuerdos humanitarios, 25 July 2005. For an unofficial English translation, see www.mediosparalapaz.org/downloads/Law_975_HRW_and_AI.rtf.

3 Rodrigo Uprimny and María Paula Saffon, Desplazamiento forzado y justicia transicional en Colombia: estudio sectorial (Bogotá, 2007); María Paula Saffon and Rodrigo Uprimny, ‘Uses and Abuses of Transitional Justice in Colombia’, in Morten Bergsmo and Pablo Kalmanovitz (eds.), Law in Peace Negotiations (Oslo, 2009), pp. 217–43; Gustavo Gallón, Michael Reed and Catalina Lleras (eds.) Anotaciones sobre la ley de justicia y paz: una mirada desde los derechos de las víctimas (Bogotá, 2007).

4 Rafael Pardo, Fin del paramilitarismo: ¿Es posible su desmonte? (Bogotá, 2007).

5 More than 20 victims have been killed in the process of claiming their rights. A victim protection programme was established in September 2007.

6 In the media and in their own institutional documents, victims' organisations and entities representing victims have from the outset criticised the law as intended to offer impunity to victimisers and consolidate power relations developed over the last few decades. See, among others, the Act of Constitution of the Movimiento Nacional de Víctimas de Crímenes de Estado (National Movement of Victims of State Crimes, MOVICE), 25 June 2005, stating opposition to Law 975, at www.movimientodevictimas.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=61. The Colombian Commission of Jurists does not see the process as contributing to the solution of the conflict, nor providing for victims' right to truth, justice and reparation. See Ana María Díaz and Carlos Alberto Marín (eds.), Colombia: el espejismo de la justicia y la paz – balance sobre la aplicación de la ley 975 de 2005 (Bogotá, 2008).

7 Eduardo Pizarro, president of the Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación (National Commission for Reparations and Reconciliation, CNNR), has repeatedly claimed that the Colombian process is unique in its embrace of international standards. Examples can be found in ‘Banco de Noticias’, at the CNRR website; see, among others, interview with Eduardo Pizarro, AHORA, 11 October 2005, available at www.cnrr.org.co/contenido/09e/spip.php?article285; and speech in Popayán, Cauca, 5 July 5, available at www.cnrr.org.co/contenido/09e/spip.php?article1688. The most relevant legal instruments setting international standards on victims' rights and accountability are the United Nations' Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, A/RES/60/147(2005), approved by General Assembly resolution 60/147 on 16 Dec. 2005, and the Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity, E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, approved by the Commission on Human Rights on 8 Feb. 2005; For a legal analysis of the former, see Zwanenburg, Marten, ‘The Van Boven/Bassiouni Principles: An Appraisal’, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, vol. 24, no. 4 (2006), pp. 641–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a brief introduction to the latter, see www.hrw.org/en/node/75972/section/9.

8 This article is based on a review of legislation and administrative documents gathered during two fieldwork periods in Bogotá in November/December 2007 and Bogotá and Córdoba in October/November 2008. This was contrasted with information obtained through interviews with: public officials from the Justice and Peace institutions; representatives from victims' organisations in MOVICE, Corporación Reiniciar and the Organización Nacional de Indígenas de Colombia (National Indigenous Organisation of Colombia, ONIC); the Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento (Centre for Human Rights and the Displaced, CODHES); the Comisión Colombiana de Juristas (Colombian Commission of Jurists, CCJ); and several academic institutions. Interviews with individual victims were also carried out in Córdoba.

9 This is an ongoing process, and empirical assessments are just being published. See Díaz and Marín, Colombia: el espejismo; Catalina Díaz, Nelson C. Sánchez and Rodrigo Uprimny (eds.), Reparar en Colombia: los dilemas en contexto de conflicto, pobreza y exclusión (Bogotá, 2009).

10 Jonathan Hartlyn, La política del régimen de coalición: la experiencia del Frente Nacional en Colombia (Bogotá, 1993); Dix, Robert H., ‘Consociational Democracy: The Case of Colombia’, Comparative Politics, vol. 12, no. 3 (1980), pp. 303–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 All figures are from Diego Otero, Experiencias de investigación: las cifras del conflicto colombiano (Bogotá, 2008), at www.indepaz.org.co/attachments/191_cifraspercent201964percent20-2007.pdf.

13 Francisco Gutiérrez, María Emma Wills and Gonzalo Sánchez (eds.), Nuestra guerra sin nombre: transformaciones del conflicto en Colombia (Bogotá, 2006); Andrés Dávila, El juego del poder: historia, armas y votos (Bogotá, 1998); Fabio Sánchez, Ana María Díaz and Michel Formisano, ‘Conflicto, crimen violento y actividad criminal en Colombia: un análisis espacial’, Documentos CEDE 2003–05, Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico, Universidad de los Andes (Bogotá, 2003).

14 Norman Offstein, ‘An Historical Review and Analysis of Colombian Guerrilla Movements: FARC, ELN and EPL’, Revista Desarrollo y Sociedad, no. 52 (Sep. 2003), pp. 99–142; Ricardo Peñaranda and Javier Guerrero (eds.), De las armas a la política (Bogotá, 1999).

15 Yamile Salinas, Darío Gonzáles and Eliza González, Tierra, oro y conflictos (Bogotá, 2008).

16 Presidency of the Republic of Colombia (PRC), Decree 3398 of 1965, Por el cual se organiza la defensa nacional.

17 CRC, Law 48 of 1968, Por la cual se adoptan como legislación permanente algunos decretos.

18 PRC, Decree 1194 of 1989, Por el cual se adiciona el decreto legislativo 0180 de 1988, para sancionar nuevas modalidades delictivas, por requerirlo el restablecimiento del orden público.

19 PRC, Decree 356 of 1994, Por el cual se expide el estatuto de vigilancia y seguridad privada.

20 In his biography, former paramilitary leader Carlos Castaño considered the decree to have favoured self-defence groups closely aligned to the drugs trade. Current president Alvaro Uribe used this decree actively while holding the position of governor in the state of Antioquia. See Mauricio Aranguren, Mi confesión (Bogotá, 2001).

21 Fabio Sánchez and Mario Chacón, ‘Conflict, State and Decentralisation: From Social Progress to Armed Dispute for Local Control 1974–2002’ (Crisis States Programme working paper no. 70, 2005).

22 Richani, Nazih, ‘The Political Economy of Violence: The War System in Colombia’, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 39, no. 2 (1997), pp. 2781CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

23 Gustavo Duncan, Los señores de la guerra: de paramilitares, mafiosos y autodefensas en Colombia (Bogotá, 2006).

24 ‘Congreso, en la mira para’, El Tiempo (Bogotá), 17 March 2002.

25 Mauricio Romero (ed.), Parapolítica: la ruta de la expansión paramilitar y los acuerdos políticos (Bogotá, 2007).

26 Mauricio Romero, ‘Elites regionales, identidades y paramilitares en el Sinú’, in Peñaranda and Guerrero (eds.), De las armas a la política, pp. 175–218.

27 Acuerdo de Santa Fé de Ralito para contribuir a la paz en Colombia (2003).

28 Alto Comisionado para la Paz (ACP), Proceso de paz con las autodefensas: informe ejecutivo (Bogotá, 2006).

29 Michael Spagat, ‘Colombia's Paramilitary DDR: Quiet and Tentative Success’ (paper presented at the International Studies Association's 49th Annual Convention, ‘Bridging Multiple Divides’, San Francisco CA, 2008).

30 Government of Colombia, Exámen periódico universal: informe de Colombia (2008), p. 5.

31 Colombian Ministry of Defence (CMD), Política de consolidación de seguridad democrática (Bogotá, 2007). These numbers should be read with caution.

32 CMD, Van casi 3.500 desmovilizados en 2008 (17 Dec. 2008). Studies showing apparent success have been criticised; different interpretations depend, among other things, on the validity of the data and lines of causality applied. See Patrick Ball et al., ‘Assessing Claims of Declining Lethal Violence in Colombia’ (2008), available at www.hrdag.org/resources/publications/CO-PN-CCJ-match-working-paper.pdf.

40 A recent case is Benigno Gil Valencia, a peasant leader killed on 22 November 2008. He was spokesman for the Mesa Nacional de Trabajo Campesina para el Programa de Recuperación de Tierras in Mutatá (CNRR Comunicado, 24 Nov. 2008, available at www.cnrr.org.co). The CNRR called for the protection of peasant leaders and victim representatives putting forward claims for land restitution.

41 According to CNRR president Eduardo Pizarro, the position held by many victims' organisations is motivated by political opposition to the current government (interview, 4 Dec. 2007, Bogotá).

42 This was confirmed during our interviews with representatives from MOVICE, Corporación Reiniciar, ONIC and CCJ in Bogotá in Nov 2007. Mistrust intensified after the first consultative meeting between the victims and government agencies in Sincelejo on 27 October 2006. Victims' organisations were sceptical about the process from the beginning, and this scepticism developed into a more general opposition. MOVICE, the largest, most vocal and most encompassing organisation, did not participate in the process. Victims' organisations were originally represented at the CNRR by ONIC and País Libre.

43 CRC, Law 418 of 1997, Por lo cual se consagran unos instrumentos para la búsqueda de la convivencia.

44 CRC, Law 548 of 1999, Por medio de la cual se prorroga la vigencia de la ley 418 del 26 de Diciembre 1997.

45 CRC, Law 782 of 2002, Por medio de la cual se prorroga la vigencia de la ley 418 del 26 de Diciembre 1997, prorrogada y modificada por la ley 548 de 1999, y se modifican algunas de sus disposiciones.

46 Other issues regulated by Law 782 include witness protection and the surrender of military equipment and material goods possessed by illegal armed groups (Articles 50–82).

47 PRC, Decree 128 of 2003, Por el cual se reglamenta la Ley 418 de 1997, prorrogada y modificada por la Ley 548 de 1999 y la Ley 782 de 2002 en materia de reincorporación a la sociedad civil.

48 Amnesty International, Colombia: los paramilitares en Medellín – ¿Desmovilización o legalización? (London, 2005); CIDH, Informe sobre la implementación de la Ley de Justicia y Paz: etapas iniciales del proceso de desmovilización de las AUC y primeras diligencias judiciales (San José, 2007).

49 Legislative Bill 85, 2003, Ley de alternatividad penal.

50 Saffon and Uprimny, ‘Uses and Abuses’, p. 224.

51 Ibid., pp. 223–4.

52 Ruling C-370 of 2006, issued by the Constitutional Court of Colombia (CC) (Bogotá, 2006), available at www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2006/C-370-06.htm.

53 An annotated law text including the CC's decisions and specific considerations can be found at www.fiscalia.gov.co/justiciapaz/Documentos/LEY_975_concordada.pdf.

54 Among others, Vicente Castaño Gil, one of the three AUC founders, withdrew from the process in 2006.

55 PRC, Decree 3391 of 2006, Por el cual se reglamenta parcialmente la ley 975 de 2005; PRC, Decree 4436 of 2006, Por el cual se reglamenta parcialmente la ley 782 de 1997.

56 Sergio de León, ‘El Presidente Uribe asegura que en Colombia “hoy no hay paramilitarismo”’, Revista Semana, 20 July 2007.

57 CNRR, Disidentes, rearmados y emergentes: bandas criminales o tercera generación paramilitar?, Informe no. 1 (Bogotá, 2007).

58 A detailed description of the specific role of public institutions in the Justice and Peace process can be found in Papel de las instituciones en la Ley de Justicia y Paz, available at www.cnrr.org.co/new/interior_otros/papel_instituciones.pdf.

59 According to Resolution 3048 (2006), the UNFJP has 15 prosecutors and 150 investigators to carry out its duties, in addition to 45 judicial assistants, 15 secretaries and 60 drivers and security staff (Prosecutor General's Office of Colombia, Resolution 2426 (2006), Por la cual se modifican los artículos 2° y 3° de la Resolución 0-2426 de agosto 3 de 2006). In August 2008, however, the government announced an increase in the number of appointed prosecutors, of which 59 would be lead prosecutors and 125 assistant prosecutors. See www.vicepresidencia.gov.co/Es/Prensa/Noticias/2008/Paginas/080826a.aspx.

60 According to Article 54 of Law 975, this was the task of the Red de Solidaridad Social, replaced by Acción Social in 2005.

61 CRC, Law 975 of 2005, Article 5, ‘Definition of victim’ (our translation).

62 Attorney General's Office, Conceptos básicos acerca de la Ley 975 de 2005 (Justicia y Paz) y de los derechos de las víctimas (Bogotá, 2007), pp. 17–18.

63 CNRR, Definiciones estratégicas de la Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación (Bogotá, 2006), pp. 3–4.

64 In comparison, the definition of ‘victim’ in the Peruvian reparations legislation includes those victimised by the Peruvian armed and police forces, but excludes former members of subversive groups (Supreme Decree 015-2006-JUS, Reglamento de la Ley No 28592, Ley que crea el Plan Integral de Reparaciones, Article 52a).

65 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Internal Displacement: Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2008 (Geneva, 2009), p. 91.

66 Interview with CNRR coordinator Eduardo Porras, Sucre's Regional Office (Montería, Nov. 2008).

67 UNFJP, Oficio 002056 A (Bogotá, 3 March 2008).

68 One may wonder how ‘internally displaced’ can be considered a category for membership or occupation first, and then how to explain the apparent mismatch between that number and the figure given for ‘forcefully displaced’ as a category of crime.

69 CODHES, 2007 Año de los Derechos de las Personas Desplazadas (Bogotá, 2006).

70 See UNFJP statistics at www.cnrr.org.co/new09/vjr/veresta.html, accessed 21 Oct. 2009.

71 The process of victim registration faces many challenges also in other parts of the world. In Peru, for example, the Reparations Council encountered a number of administrative, financial and logistical problems in setting up the Registro Unico de Víctimas (Unified Victims Registry). Individual victim registration started in September 2007. By October 2009, the number of victims registered was 61,000; the total expected number of victims is 280,000. See www.ruv.gob.pe/Boletin/Boletin8/not1/not1.htm.

72 ACP, Proceso de paz con las Autodefensas: informe ejecutivo (Bogotá, 2006).

73 This shift to an ordinary criminal process can involve extradition for postulados who have extradition requests from other countries.

74 The Constitutional Court decided that combatants should be sentenced according to ordinary criminal law, with sentences ranging from 20 to 60 years, and that sentencing defined by Law 975 would be seen as an alternative sentencing (Ruling C-370 of 2006).

75 See note 7.

76 CC Ruling C-370 imposed more stringent conditions on the paramilitaries in order to respect the right to truth and deny them the option of forgetting. If the paramilitaries are found to be responsible for crimes that they have not confessed, the conditions are considered broken and the victimiser will not enjoy the benefits laid out in Law 975. It is unclear how this will be applied by individual magistrates, however.

77 Interview with Eduardo Pizarro, Nov. 2007.

79 CNRR, Plan Área de Memoria Histórica (Bogotá, 2007), p. 1.

80 The report, entitled Trujillo: una tragedia que no cesa, along with a documentary film and other related materials, can be downloaded from the CNRR website at www.cnrr.org.co.

82 In both countries, victim reparations programmes followed recommendations made by the truth commissions. In Colombia, reparations are developed prior to the work of a truth commission.

83 CNRR, Definiciones estratégicas, p. 5, available at www.cnrr.org.co/definiciones.htm.

84 United Nations, Basic Principles on the Right to Remedy and Reparation, paragraphs 12 and 22.

85 CNRR, Definiciones estratégicas, p. 4.

86 See note 7.

87 CNRR, Definiciones estratégicas, pp. 5–6.

88 CRC, Law 975 of 2005, Articles 8, 46, 47 and 48.

89 A list entitled Estadística de incidentes de reparación can be found at the UNFJP website at www.fiscalia.gov.co/justiciapaz/Documentos/Incidentes.pdf. The list is constantly updated. When accessed on 28 January 2009, the list was 31 pages long and all entries were numbered, from 1 to 463. The same list accessed on 2 April 2009 was 32 pages long but no longer enumerated.

90 This refers to the process against Wilson Salazar Carrascal, alias ‘El Loro, completed in March 2009 but later overturned by the Supreme Court. For a discussion of the outcome of this process concerning victim reparations, see Catalina Díaz Gómez and Camilo Ernesto Bernal Sarmiento, ‘El diseño institucional de reparaciones en la Ley de Justicia y Paz: una evaluación preliminar’, in Díaz, Sánchez and Uprimny (eds.), Reparar en Colombia, pp. 581–621.

91 Ficha de relatoría no. 6, sentencia del 23 de Mayo de 2008, Sala de Casación Penal, Corte Suprema de Justicia, Radicación 29642, in Prosecutor General's Office, Tercera entrega de extractos de providencias bajo el marco de la Ley 975 de 2005 (Bogotá, Jan.–July 2008).

92 Colombian Ministry of Interior and Justice, Decree 1290 of 2008, Por el cual se crea el programa de reparación individual por vía administrativa para las víctimas de los grupos armados organizados al margen de la ley.

93 A discussion on the difference between solidarity and responsibility as the basis for victim reparations can be found in Nelson Camilo Sánchez, ‘¿Perder es ganar un poco?: avances y frustraciones de la discusión del Estatuto de Víctimas en Colombia’, in Díaz, Sánchez and Uprimny (eds.), Reparar en Colombia, pp. 623–718.

94 ‘Reparaciones por vía administrativa se agilizarían este año’, CNRR Noticias, 26 Jan. 2009, available at www.cnrr.org.co/contenido/09e/spip.php?article48.

96 CNRR, Informe al Congreso: proceso de reparación a las víctimas – balance actual y perspectivas futuras (Bogotá, 2007).

97 Five pilot projects were initiated in 2008 (interview with Eduardo Pizarro, Nov. 2008). In June 2009, a CNRR official informed us that the projects were still in a preparatory stage.

98 Examples of media outreach are the radio programmes La hora de las víctimas (Victims' Hour) and Las víctimas cuentan (The Victims Tell Us), and the television documentary series Nunca más (Never Again), sponsored by the CNNR. See www.cnrr.org.co/new/radio09.html, www.cnrr.org.co/new/vicuentan.html and www.cnrr.org.co/new/nuncamas.htm.

99 See note 6.

100 Rodrigo Uprimny (ed.), ¿Justicia transicional sin transición?: reflexiones sobre verdad, justicia y reparación en Colombia (Bogotá, 2005); Pardo, Fin del paramilitarismo.

101 Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State (Durham NC, 2001), p. 18.

102 Richard Ashby Wilson, ‘Human Rights, Culture and Context: An Introduction’, in Richard Ashby Wilson (ed.), Human Rights, Culture and Context: Anthropological Perspectives (London, 1997), pp. 1–27.

103 Sally Engle Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism and Transnational Culture: The Ka Ho'okolokolonui Kanaka Maoli Tribunal, Hawai'i, 1993’, in Wilson (ed.), Human Rights, Culture and Context, pp. 28–48.

104 Rachel Sieder, ‘Rethinking Citizenship: Reforming the Law in Postwar Guatemala’, in Hansen and Stepputat, States of Imagination, p. 204.

105 Somers, Margaret, ‘Citizenship and the Place of the Public Sphere: Law, Community, and Political Culture in the Transition to Democracy’, American Sociological Review, vol. 58, no. 5 (1993), pp. 587620CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

106 Bryan S. Turner, ‘Outline of a Theory of Human Rights’, in Bryan S. Turner (ed.), Citizenship and Social Theory (London, 1993), p. 173.

107 According to Law 975, Article 6, ‘justice’ is defined as holding the individual perpetrator responsible for the atrocities committed, and providing for the right to reparation and the right to non-repetition.

108 IDPs are not explicitly mentioned in Law 975, but they are included in the operational definition of ‘victims’. Article 46, however, explicitly states the right to restitution understood as the return to one's place of residence and devolution of property stolen. For a critical review of the relationship between forced displacement and the TJ process in Colombia, see Uprimny and Saffon, Desplazamiento forzado.

109 Saffon and Uprimny, ‘Uses and Abuses’, p. 232.

110 This may not always be the case; the victim category can also have limiting effects. ‘Victim’ is often associated with being a passive object of violent acts, a view that ignores the actor's agency in the specific situation or in a larger historical context. For an example of limiting effects, see García-Godos, Jemima, ‘Victim Reparations in the Peruvian Truth Commission and the Challenge of Historical Interpretation’, International Journal of Transitional Justice, vol. 2, no. 1 (2008), pp. 6382CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

111 MOVICE itself was founded by 800 delegates from different victims' organisations in June 2005 in response to Law 975. See MAPP-OEA, Décimo tercero informe trimestral (Bogotá, 2009); Saffon and Uprimny, ‘Uses and Abuses’; and Díaz, Sánchez and Uprimny (eds.), Reparar en Colombia.

112 The latest development in this regard is the bill known as the Estatuto de Víctimas, presented to the Senate in 2008 and dismissed by Congress months later. The proposal could have strengthened and protected victims' rights, and was supported by public institutions and civil society organisations alike. For a discussion of the legislative process, see Sánchez, ‘¿Perder es ganar un poco?’.