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A Rational Choice Model for the Dakota Effect

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 2008

Jac C. Heckelman
Affiliation:
Wake Forest University

Extract

In a recent issue, Young and Sigelman (2008) present evidence of a “Dakota effect,” in which persons born in the Dakotas are disproportionately likely to represent their home state, other states, and also generate government spending directed toward the Dakotas. These authors are unable to explain the causal underpinnings for overrepresentation in Congress or the Dakotan natives' keen ability to direct pork back to these two states.

Type
Forum
Copyright
Copyright © The American Political Science Association 2008

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References

Balla, Steven, Lawrence, Eric, Maltzman, Forrest, and Sigelman, Lee. 2002. “Partisanship, Blame Avoidance, and the Distribution of Legislative Pork.” American Journal of Political Science 46 (July): 515–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Green, Donald P., and Shapiro, Ian. 1994. Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Heckelman, Jac C. 2007. “Explaining the Rain: The Rise and Decline of Nations after 25 Years.” Southern Economic Journal 74 (July): 1833.Google Scholar
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Young, Garry, and Sigelman, Lee. 2008. “The Dakota Effect.” PS: Political Science and Politics 16 (April): 349–53.Google Scholar