Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-cfpbc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-24T00:00:09.466Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe From Korea Not for Attribution*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 September 2015

Gene M. Grossman  and
Petros C. Mavroidis
Gene M. Grossman
Affiliation:
Princeton University
Petros C. Mavroidis
Affiliation:
University of Neuchâtel and Columbia University
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

This dispute concerns the imposition of a definitive safeguard measure by the United States on imports of circular welded carbon quality line pipe (“line pipe”) from Korea (WTO DOC. WTO/DS 202/AB/R). The measure was imposed following an investigation conducted by the US International Trade Commission (USITC). The USITC determined in a safeguard investigation initiated on 29 July 1999 that “circular welded carbon quality line pipe . . . is being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or the threat of serious injury.” In its investigation, the USITC identified a number of factors apart from increased imports that might have caused serious injury or threat of serious injury to the domestic line pipe industry. The Commission concluded that increased imports were “a cause which is important and not less than any other cause” and that, therefore, the statutory requirement of “substantial cause” had been met.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Trade Review , Volume 4 , Special Issue S1: The WTO Case Law Of 2002 , 2005 , pp. 99 - 132
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2005

Footnotes

*

This study reviews the WTO Appellate Body report United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe From Korea (WT/DS202/AB/R 15 February 2002). We are grateful to Henrik Horn and Jasper-Martijn Wauters for helpful discussions and to Alan Sykes, whose paper (Sykes, 2003) profoundly influenced our thinking about these issues.

References

Baldwin, Richard E. and Frédéric, Robert-Nicoud. 2001. Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers. Manuscript, Graduate Institute for International Studies, Geneva.Google Scholar
Burtless, Gary, Lawrence, Robert Z., Litan, Robert E. and Shapiro, Robert J. 1998. Globaphobia: Confronting Fears About Open Trade. The Brookings Institution: Washington.Google Scholar
Cassing, James H. and Ochs, Jack. 1978. International Trade, Factor Market Distortions, and the Optimal Dynamic Subsidy: Comment. American Economic Review 68, 950–955.Google Scholar
Davidson, Carl and Matusz, Stephen J. 2001. On Adjustment Costs. Manuscript, Michigan State University.Google Scholar
Davidson, Carl and Matusz, Stephen J. 2002. An Overlapping Generations Model of Escape Clause Protection. Manuscript, Michigan State University.Google Scholar
Deardorff, Alan V. 1987. Safeguards Policy and the Conservative Social Welfare Function. pp. 22–40 in Kierzkowski, H., ed., Protection and Competition in International Trade: Essay in Honor of W. Max Corden. Blackwell Publishers: Oxford.Google Scholar
Feenstra, Robert C. 1992. How Costly is Protection? Journal of Economic Perspectives 12, 159–178.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grossman, Gene M. 1986. Imports as a Cause of Injury: The Case of the U.S. Steel Industry. Journal of International Economics 121, 201–223.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grossman, Gene M. and Helpman, Elhanan. 1994. Protection for Sale. American Economic Review 84, 833–850.Google Scholar
Grossman, Gene M. and Mavroidis, Petros C. 2003. Here Today, Gone Tomorrow? Privatization and the Injury Caused by Non-Recurring Subsidies. A Discussion of the Appellate Body Report on United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom in Horn, H. and Mavroidis, P.C., eds., The WTO Case Law of 2001. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge UK.Google Scholar
Horn, Henrik and Mavroidis, Petros C. 2003. What Should be Required of a Safeguard Investigation? A Discussion of the Appellate Body Report On United States – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia in Horn, H. and Mavroidis, P.C., eds., The WTO Case Law of 2001. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge UK.Google Scholar
Hufbauer, Gary Clyde and Kimberly Ann, Elliot. 1994. Measuringthe Costs ofProtection in the United States. Institute of International Economics: Washington DC.Google Scholar
Irwin, Douglas A. 2002. Causing Problems? The WTO Review of Causation and Injury Attribution in U.S. Section 201 Cases. NBER Working Paper No. 9815, Cambridge MA.Google Scholar
Kelly, Kenneth. 1988. The Analysis of Causality in Escape Clause Cases. Journal of Industrial Economics, 37, 187–207.Google Scholar
Lapan, Harvey. 1976. International Trade, Factor Market Distortions, and the Optimal Dynamic Subsidy. American Economic Review, 66, 335–346.Google Scholar
Messerlin, Patrick A. 2001. Measuring the Costs of Protection in Europe: European Commercial Policy in the 2000s. Institute of International Economics: Washington DC.Google Scholar
Mussa, Michael. 1982. Government Policy and the Adjustment Process. pp. 73–120 in Jagdish, Bhagwati, ed., Import Competition and Response. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.Google Scholar
Mussa, Michael. 1984. The Adjustment Process and the Timing of Trade Liberalization. NBER Working Paper No. 1458, Cambridge MA.Google Scholar
Neary, J. Peter. 1982. Intersectoral Capital Mobility, Wage Stickiness, and the Case for Adjustment Assistance. pp. 39–67 in Bhagwati, Jagdish, ed., Import Competition and Response. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.Google Scholar
Rousslang, Donald J. 1988. Import Injury in U.S. Trade Law: An Economic View. International Review of Law and Economics 8, 177–182.Google Scholar
Sazanami, Yoko, Urata, Shujiro, and Hiroki, Kawai. 1995. Measuring the Costs of Protection in Japan. Institute of International Economics: Washington DC.Google Scholar
Sykes, Alan O. 1991. Protectionism as a ‘Safeguard’: A Positive Analysis of GATT Escape Clause with Normative Speculations. University of Chicago Law Review, 58, 255–307.Google Scholar
Sykes, Alan O. 2003. The Safeguards Mess: A Critique of WTO Jurisprudence. John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 187 (2D Series), University of Chicago Law School.Google Scholar