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Market Design, Manipulation, and Accuracy in Political Prediction Markets: Lessons from the Iowa Electronic Markets

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 April 2014

Joyce E. Berg  and
Thomas A. Rietz
Joyce E. Berg
Affiliation:
University of Iowa
Thomas A. Rietz
Affiliation:
University of Iowa
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Abstract

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Type
Symposium: US Presidential Election Forecasting
Information
PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 47 , Issue 2 , April 2014 , pp. 293 - 296
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2014 

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References

REFERENCES

Berg, Joyce E., and Rietz, Thomas A.. 2006. “The Iowa Electronic Markets: Stylized Facts and Open Issues.” In Information Markets: A New Way of Making Decisions in the Public and Private Sectors, eds. Hahn, Robert W. and Tetlock, Paul C., 142–69. Washington, DC: AEI-Brookings Joint Center.Google Scholar
Berg, Joyce E., Nelson, Forrest D., and Rietz, Thomas A.. 2008. “Prediction Market Accuracy in the Long Run.” International Journal of Forecasting 24 (2): 283–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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Simon, Herbert A. 1954. “Bandwagon and Underdog Effects and the Possibility of Election Predictions.” Public Opinion Quarterly 18 (3): 245–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar