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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 September 2010
Christopher Johnson argued in ‘Reconsidering the Ad Hominem’ that, in certain exceptional cases, appealing to ad hominem considerations is logically justifiable. My argument is that ad hominem considerations are no different than other evidential considerations. The evidential links may be strong, weak or nonexistent but there is nothing special in itself about considering ad hominem factors when weighing evidence. Like all the informal fallacies, simply because a claim has the signature of being ‘ad hominem’ does not make it irrelevant. The apparent originality of Johnson's point lies in equivocating ‘ad hominem fallacy’ with ‘ad hominem considerations’. It is not looking to personal characteristics or situations that in itself is illogical. It is when those features have no evidential link to the point at hand.
1 Johnson, Christopher M., ‘Reconsidering the Ad Hominem’, Philosophy 84 (2009), 251–266.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2 Ibid. 257.
3 Ibid. 257–258.
4 Ibid. 254–256.
5 Ibid. 257–258.
6 Ibid. 253. Johnson is correct that in its classic form tu quoque also attacks personal characteristics as a way to avoid the relevant evidence in an argument. However, by using examples of tu quoque in a paragraph designed to show examples of the circumstantial ad hominem, he conflates quite different traditional fallacies. In the ad hominems, three parties are always involved – the arguer, the listener and the person being attacked. Tu quoque is strictly a one-on-one confrontation in which the arguer directly points to the characteristics of the person being attacked. In the ad hominem the listener is passive and changing his or her ideas is intended to be the goal of the illogical persuasion. Tu quoque has no third party. It is also not clear in this and the following paragraph whether Johnson uses accurate examples to distinguish the circumstantial and abusive forms of the ad hominem. The obese doctor giving advice about weight loss and the smoking-addicted parent talking about not smoking seem much more intended in the fallacy to be attacks on the person per se rather than circumstances. And, in the following paragraph, denigrating a person's views on municipal politics because he or she owes a debt appears to be more an example of the circumstantial rather than the abusive. Granted, the distinction is often vague but Johnson's examples do not clarify the distinction.
7 Ibid. 262.
8 Ibid. 261.
9 Ibid. 265.
