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Private Equity Fund Compensation Contracts and Their Incentive Effects

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2009

Ludovic Phalippou
Ludovic Phalippou
Affiliation:
Associate Professor of Finance, University of Amsterdam Business School, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. E-mail: l.phalippou@uva.nl.
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Abstract

This article describes compensation contracts in private equity. It shows that they may not align interest between the investors and fund managers as much as commonly thought. Certain clauses appear as potentially hazardous for investors and others exacerbate conflicts of interest.

Keywords

private equitycompensation contracts
Type
Articles
Information
European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR) , Volume 10 , Issue 3 , September 2009 , pp. 465 - 472
Copyright
Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press and the Authors 2009

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