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The Intelligence and Security Committee and the challenge of security networks

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 October 2009

Abstract

A major feature of current security is the development of intelligence networks between agencies within and between nations and across public and private sectors. The performance of the UK Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) is examined within this context, especially regarding allegations of collusion by UK agencies in rendition and torture. Proposed changes to the ISC are discussed and it is argued that the ISC must seek to leverage its limited powers by helping to construct an oversight network.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 2009

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References

1 P. Knightley, The Second Oldest Profession: the spy as patriot, bureaucrat, fantasist and whore (London: André Deutsch, 1986).

2 A recent summary of the issues is provided by Stuart Farson and Reg Whitaker, ‘Democratic Deficit Be Damned: the executive use of legislators to scrutinize national security in Canada’, in L.Johnson (ed.), Strategic Intelligence, Volume 1: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), p. 65–88.

3 Malone v. UK (1984) 7 EHRR 14.

4 Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner for 2007, HC947, 22 July 2008, para. 1.4; V. Williams, Surveillance and Intelligence Law Handbook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 217. Reports of the commissioners and tribunal are available at {http://www.intelligence.gov.uk/accountability/commissioners_and_tribunal.aspx}

5 Report of the Intelligence Services Commissioner for 2007, HC948, 22 July 2008, para. 9; Williams, Surveillance and Intelligence Law, p. 218.

6 The existence of the surveillance tapes was publicised by John Ware, ‘Omagh: what the police were never told’, Panorama, broadcast BBC1, (15 September 2008).

7 Gibson, Review of Intercepted Intelligence in relation to the Omagh bombing of 15 August 1998, {http://www.nio.gov.uk/review_of_intercepted_intelligence_in_relation_to_the_omagh_bombing_of_15_august_1998.pdf} 16 January 2009, accessed on 20 January 2009. Panorama response is at {http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/12_02_09_panoramagibsonresponse.pdf}

8 Williams, Surveillance and Intelligence Law, pp. 231–42. See also {http://www.ipt-uk.com/default.asp}.

9 Report of the Intelligence Services Commissioner for 2005–06, HC314, 19 February 2007, para. 38.

10 Detailed accounts are provided by P. Gill, ‘Evaluating Intelligence Oversight Committees: the UK ISC and the “War on Terror”’, Intelligence and National Security 22:1 (2007), pp. 14–37 at pp. 18–21; A. Glees, P. Davies and J. Morrison, The Open Side of Secrecy: Britain's Intelligence and Security Committee (London: Social Affairs Unit, 2006), pp. 34–9; M. Phythian, ‘The British Experience with Intelligence Accountability’, Intelligence and National Security, 22:1 (2007), pp. 75–99 at pp. 75–80. ISC Reports are available at {http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/intelligence/}.

11 For example, nothing has leaked from the Committee to the media. The day before its first report on the 7/7 London bombings (Cm6786) was published, the main findings were leaked to the BBC but it is not known whether these came from the ISC or Downing Street.

12 Phythian, ‘British Experience’, p. 97.

13 Glees et al., The Open Side, p. 93.

14 Gill, ‘Evaluating’, pp. 27–34.

15 Phythian, ‘British Experience’, pp. 95–7.

16 Glees et al., The Open Side, pp. 94–5.

17 Phythian, ‘British Experience’, p. 96.

18 Glees et al, The Open Side, p. 94. Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, HC898, 14 July 2004.

19 P. Gill, ‘Keeping “Earthly Awkwardness”; failures of intelligence in the UK’, in T. Bruneau and S. Boraz (eds), Reforming Intelligence: obstacles to democratic control and effectiveness (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), pp. 96–120; Glees et al, The Open Side, p. 175.

20 Ken Robertson, ‘Recent Reform of Intelligence in the United Kingdom: democratization or risk management?’ Intelligence and National Security, 13:2 (1998), pp. 144–58; see also Peter Gill, ‘Reasserting Control: recent changes in the oversight of the UK intelligence community’, Intelligence and National Security, 11:2 (1996), pp. 313–31.

21 Glees et al., The Open Side, p. 116.

22 Intelligence and Security Committee, Handling of Detainees by UK Intelligence Personnel in Afghanistan, Guantánamo Bay and Iraq, Cm6469, March 2005.

23 Intelligence and Security Committee, Handling of Detainees, para. 33.

24 A. M. Taguba, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, March 2004, Part One Findings of Fact, para.10, reprinted in Karen Greenberg and Joshua Dratel, The Torture papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 405–57.

25 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Discrepancies in Evidence Given to the Committee, Twenty Eighth Report, HL157/HC527, 27 July 2008.

26 This account is drawn from Peter Gill, ‘Rendition in a Transnational Insecure Environment: can we keep intelligence co-operation honest?’ in E. Aydinli (ed.), Emerging Transnational (In)security Governance: a statist-transnationalist approach (Abingdon: Routledge, forthcoming), pp. 144–71. Intelligence and Security Committee, Rendition, Cm7171, July 2007, paras. 111–47.

27 Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar, Factual background (2 volumes), Analysis and Recommendations, A New review mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities, Ottawa: Public Works and Services, 2006, {http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/maher_arar/07-09-13/www.ararcommission.ca/default.htm} Discussed further below.

28 Intelligence and Security Committee, Rendition, para. 137

29 Ibid., paras. 102–3.

30 A fuller account is given by Dick Marty, Alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states, Report to Parliamentary Assembly, Doc.10957, Council of Europe, 12 June 2006, 3.9 {http://assembly.coe.int}. Details of detainee treatment at Guantánamo are contained in two articles by Mark Danner, drawing on the International Committee of the Red Cross 2007 report: New York Review of Books, 9 April 2009, pp. 69–77; 30 April 2009, pp. 48–56.

31 Intelligence and Security Committee, Rendition, p.34.

32 R. Norton-Taylor, ‘MI5 criticised for role in case of torture, rendition and secrecy’, The Guardian (22 August 2008), pp. 1–2.

33 I. Cobain, ‘MI5 accused of colluding in torture of terrorist suspects’, The Guardian (29 April 2008), pp. 1, 8–9.

34 I. Cobain & R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Met investigation fails to quell calls for independent inquiry’, The Guardian (27 March 2009), pp. 14–5.

35 ISC, Alleged Complicity of the UK security and intelligence Agencies in torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, 17 March 2009 {http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/143156/090317_alledged.pdf} accessed on 20 March 2009; Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘MI5 officer gave false evidence in Guantánamo detainee case’, The Guardian (21 April 2009), p. 9.

36 Gordon Brown, Hansard, 18 March 2009, column 55WS; David Miliband, uncorrected evidence before the Foreign Affairs Committee, 16 June 2009, Qns. 116–118.

37 cf. Glees et al, The Open Side, pp. 181–2.

38 Ann Taylor, Paul Murphy and Margaret Beckett followed this path. Kim Howells, the current Chair, is a former foreign office minister for counter terrorism.

39 The Governance of Britain – constitutional renewal, Cm 7342-I, March 2008, paras. 235–44.

40 Meaning that it was two years since some of the occurrences reported on by the ISC.

41 Glees et al., The Open Side, 177–8; Phythian, ‘British Experience’, p. 98.

42 ISC member, interviewed June 2008. Another member interviewed described officials' initial suggestions for redactions as ‘bollocks’.

43 Interviews with two ISC members, June 2008.

44 Intelligence and Security Committee, Interim Report Cm2873, May 1995, para. 8.

45 Quoted in Glees et al., The Open Side, p. 101.

46 Michael Mates, speaking on Newsnight, BBC2 (19 May 2009); ISC, Could 7/7 Have Been Prevented? Review of the Intelligence on the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005, Cm7617, May 2009, para. 11.

47 Compare RIPA s.58(1) with Intelligence Services Act Schedule 3, s.3.

48 Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2006–07, paras. 123–6.

49 Interviews with three ISC members, June 2008.

50 In the ISC's further investigations into rendition it was ‘[…] further informed by the Director General of the Security Service that new information had come to light about the Binyam Mohamed case which had been overlooked during the Committee's original rendition inquiry.’ ISC, Alleged Complicity…'

51 John Stevens' investigations into security forces collusion with paramilitaries were obstructed in various ways, including arson at his office in January 1990. John Stevens, Stevens Enquiry: overview and recommendations, 17 April 2003, para. 3.4.

52 For example, Les Johnston and Clifford Shearing, Governing Security, (London: Routledge, 2003).

53 T. Benner et al, ‘Multisectoral Networks in Global Governance: towards a pluralistic system of accountability’, in David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (eds), Global Governance and Public Accountability (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 67–86 at pp.72–3.

54 The application of these to intelligence is discussed in P. Gill and M. Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), pp. 57–60.

55 Gill and Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World, pp. 39–56.

56 Michael Warner describes these actors as ‘sovereignties, distinguishable and divided from another by their competitive willingness to use violence to hold or gain control over people, resources and territory.’ ‘Intelligence as risk shifting’, in P. Gill, S. Marrin and M. Phythian (eds), Intelligence Theory: key questions and debates (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 16–32 at p. 20. There is no space here to discuss the implications of non-state intelligence actors; see, for example, D. Donald, ‘Private Security Companies and Intelligence Provision’, in A. Alexandra, D. P. Baker and M. Caparini (eds), Private Military and Security Companies: ethics, policies and civil-military relations (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), pp. 131–42; T. Shorrock, Spies for Hire: the secret world of intelligence outsourcing (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008).

57 A. Rubin and D. Cave, ‘In a Force for Iraqi Calm, Seeds of Conflict’, The New York Times (23 December 2007).

58 cf. Commission of Inquiry, A New Review Mechanism, p. 456.

59 Commission of Inquiry, Analysis and Recommendations, p. 77.

60 Commission of Inquiry, A New Review Mechanism, pp. 82–91.

61 Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2006–07, para. 5.

62 For example, R. J. Aldrich, ‘US-European Intelligence Co-operation on Counter-Terrorism: low politics and compulsion’, British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 11:1 (2009), pp. 122–39; Thorsten Wetzling, ‘European Counterterrorism Intelligence Liaisons’, in Stuart Farson et al (eds), Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches, Vol. 2 (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008), pp. 498–529.

63 Marty, Alleged secret detentions, 2006; Secret detentions and unlawful transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states: second report, Doc.11302 rev., Council of Europe, 11 June 2007 {http://assembly.coe.int}.

64 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Disaggregated Sovereignty: towards the public accountability of global government networks’, in Held and Koenig-Archibugi (eds), Global Governance and Public Accountability, pp. 35–66 at p. 47.

65 Belgian Standing Intelligence Agencies Review Committee, Activity Reports 2006, 2007: Investigations and Recommendations, (Intersentia: Antwerp, 2008), x.

66 R. J. Aldrich, ‘Global Intelligence Co-operation versus Accountability: new facets to an old problem’, Intelligence and National Security, 24:1 (2009), pp. 26–56 at p. 36–7.

67 cf. Hans Born, ‘International Intelligence Co-operation: the need for networking accountability’, address to NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Reykjavik, 6 October 2007.

68 Below the radar: secret flights to torture and ‘disappearance’, 5 April 2006; State of Denial: Europe's role in rendition and secret detention, June 2008, {www.amnesty.org}.

69 Ghost Plane: the true story of the CIA rendition and torture program (New York: St, Martin's Press, 2006).

70 Marty, Alleged Secret Detentions, 2006; Secret detentions, 2007 {http://assembly.coe.int}.

72 The story is told by S. Wright, ‘The ECHELON Trail: an illegal vision’, Surveillance and Society (2005), 3:2/3, pp. 198–215.

73 Aldrich, ‘Global Intelligence Co-operation…’, pp. 39–40.

74 Benner et al., ‘Multisectoral Networks’, pp. 75–6.

75 See, for example, Aldrich, ‘Global Intelligence Co-operation…’.

76 M. Deflem, Policing World Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

77 Hans Born and Ian Leigh, Making Intelligence Accountable: legal standards and best practice for oversight of intelligence agencies (Oslo: Publishing House of Parliament of Norway, 2005).

78 Aldrich, ‘US-European Intelligence Co-operation…’ pp. 133–4.

79 Also, see Leigh, ‘Reviewing International Cooperation of Security and Intelligence Agencies’, Paper given to Intelligence Governance section of ECPR Conference, Pisa, September 2007.

80 Marty, Secret detentions and unlawful transfers, 2007, para. 168.

81 cf. Benner et al., ‘Multisectoral Networks’, p. 74.