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Varieties of self-explanation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2009

Dominic Murphy
Dominic Murphy
Affiliation:
Unit for History and Philosophy of Science, University of Sydney, Carslaw FO7, Camperdown, NSW 2006, Australiad.murphy@usyd.edu.auhttp://www.usyd.edu.au/hps/staff/academic/Dominic_Murphy.shtml
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Abstract

Carruthers is right to reject the idea of a dedicated piece of cognitive architecture with the exclusive job of reading our own minds. But his mistake is in trying to explain introspection in terms of any one mindreading system. We understand ourselves in many different ways via many systems.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , April 2009 , pp. 155 - 156
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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References

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