Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-x4r87 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-26T16:23:00.468Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Uncertain premises and Jeffrey's rule

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

David E. Over  and
Constantinos Hadjichristidis
David E. Over
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Durham University, Durham DH1 3LE, United Kingdomdavid.over@durham.ac.uk
Constantinos Hadjichristidis
Affiliation:
Facoltà di Scienze Cognitive, Università degli Studi di Trento, 38068 Rovereto, Italy. k.hadjichristidis@form.unitn.it
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Oaksford & Chater (O&C) begin in the halfway Bayesian house of assuming that minor premises in conditional inferences are certain. We demonstrate that this assumption is a serious limitation. They additionally suggest that appealing to Jeffrey's rule could make their approach more general. We present evidence that this rule is not limited enough to account for actual probability judgements.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 1 , February 2009 , pp. 97 - 98
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Evans, J. St. B. T. & Over, D. E. (1996a) Rationality and reasoning. Psychology Press.Google Scholar
Evans, J. St. B. T., Stevenson, R. J., Over, D. E., Handley, S. J. & Sloman, S. A. (2004) ESRC end of grant report, No. R00239074. The Economic and Social Research Council.Google Scholar
Hadjichristidis, C., Sloman, S. A. & Over, D. E. (in preparation) Revision of beliefs from probabilistic categorical arguments.Google Scholar
Howson, C. & Urbach, P. (1993) Scientific reasoning: The Bayesian approach, 2nd edition.Open Court.Google Scholar
Jeffrey, R. C. (1983) The logic of decision, 2nd edition.University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Oaksford, M. & Chater, N. (2007) Bayesian rationality: The probabilistic approach to human reasoning. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Over, D. E., Hadjichristidis, C., Evans, J. St. B. T., Handley, S. J. & Sloman, S. A. (2007) The probability of causal conditionals. Cognitive Psychology 54:62–97.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Stevenson, R. J. & Over, D. E. (1995) Deduction from uncertain premises. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 48A:613–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stevenson, R. J. & Over, D. E. (2001) Reasoning from uncertain premises. Effects of expertise and conversational context. Thinking and Reasoning 7:367–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar