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Development, consciousness, and the perception/mental representation distinction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 1999

Lorraine McCune
Affiliation:
Department of Educational Psychology, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08903 mccune@rci.rutgers.edu

Abstract

Perceptual symbol systems provide a welcome alternative to amodal encapsulated means of cognitive processing. However, the relations between perceived reality and internal mentation require a more differentiated approach, reflecting both developmental differences between infant and adult experience and qualitative differences between consciously perceived and mentally represented contents. Neurological evidence suggests a developmental trajectory from initial perceptual states in infancy to a more differentiated consciousness from two years of age on. Children's processing of and verbal expressions regarding motion events provides an example of the changing capacity for mental experience.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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