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Modality and abstract concepts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 1999

Fred Adams  and
Kenneth Campbell
Fred Adams
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716 fa@udel.edu www.udel.edu/Philosophy/famain.html
Kenneth Campbell
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716 kencamp@udel.edu www.udel.edu/psych/fingerle/Kencamp.htm
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Abstract

Our concerns fall into three areas: (1) Barsalou fails to make clear what simulators are (vs. what they do); (2) activation of perceptual areas of the brain during thought does not distinguish between the activation's being constitutive of concepts or a mere causal consequence (Barsalou needs the former); and (3) Barsalou's attempt to explain how modal symbols handle abstraction fails.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 4 , August 1999 , pp. 610
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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