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Imitation and mirror self-recognition may be developmental precursors to theory of mind in human and nonhuman primates

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 1998

Kim A. Bard
Kim A. Bard
Affiliation:
Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Human and Behavioral Genetics Laboratory, Emory University School of Medicine, Atlanta, GA 30322 kbard@emory.edu
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Abstract

Heyes argues that nonhuman primates are unable to imitate, recognize themselves in mirrors, and take another's perspective, and that none of these capabilities are evidence for theory of mind. First, her evaluation of the evidence, especially for imitation and mirror self-recognition, is inaccurate. Second, she neglects to address the important developmental evidence that these capabilities are necessary precursors in the development of theory of mind.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 21 , Issue 1 , February 1998 , pp. 115
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press

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