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Self-deceivers' intentions and possessions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1997

Michael Losonsky
Michael Losonsky
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Colorado State University, Ft. Collins, CO 80523 losonsky@lamar.colostate.edu www.colostate.edu/depts/philosophy/losonsky
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Abstract

Although Mele's four sufficient conditions for self-deception are on track insofar as they avoid the requirement that self-deception involves contradictory beliefs, they are too weak, because they are broad enough to include cases of bias or prejudice that are not typical cases of self-deception. I discuss what distinguishes self-deception from other forms of bias.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 1997 , pp. 121 - 122
Copyright
© 1997 Cambridge University Press

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