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“Causation” is only part of the answer

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 March 2005

Matthias Scheutz*
Affiliation:
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN46556http://www.nd.edu/~mscheutz/

Abstract:

Although Ross & Spurrett (R&S) successfully fend off the threat of Kim's “supervenience argument” by showing that it conflates different notions of causation, their proposal for a dynamic systems answer to the mind-body problem is itself yet another supervenience claim in need of an explanation that justifies it. The same goes for their notion of “multiple supervenience.”

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004

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References

Notes

1. It is also not clear what work the qualifier “broad” is supposed to do: it seems perfectly plausible that one could know all facts about feedbackdriven servosystems (e.g., in the sense worked out by “control theory”) and still not understand at all how these facts pertain to minds (i.e., how control states are related to mental states).