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A new anti-Molinist argument

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 September 1999

WILLIAM HASKER
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Huntington College, Huntington, IN 46750

Abstract

An argument is given showing that, on the assumptions of Molinism, human beings must bring about the truth of the counterfactuals of freedom that govern their actions. But, it is claimed, it is impossible for humans to do this, and so Molinism is involved in a contradiction. The Molinist must maintain, on the contrary, that we can indeed bring about the truth of counterfactuals of freedom about us. This question turns out to depend on whether the counterfactuals of freedom are, or are entailed by, part of the causal history of the world. A further argument is given that these counterfactuals are entailed by events intrinsic to the world's history. If this is so, then we cannot bring about the truth of these counterfactuals; the anti-Molinist argument succeeds, and Molinism is refuted.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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