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Physicalism without unknowable colors

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 2003

Peter W. Ross
Peter W. Ross*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, CA91768http://www.csupomona.edu/~pwross
*
pwross@csupomona.edu
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Abstract:

Byrne & Hilbert (2003; henceforth B&H) do not adequately explain how it is that phenomenal colors are physical colors, as their physicalism claims. This explanation requires more characterization of the relationship between the epistemology and nature of color than B&H provide. With this characterization, we can see that a physicalist need not accept unknowable color facts, as B&H do.

Type
Continuing Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 26 , Issue 6 , December 2003 , pp. 789
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004

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References

Commentary on Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2003). Color realism and color science. BBS 26(1):3–21.

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