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Essence and Being

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2008

Scott A. Shalkowski
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Extract

In ‘Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence’ E. J. Lowe defends “serious essentialism”. Serious essentialism is the position that (a) everything has an essence, (b) essences are not themselves things, and (c) essences are the ground for metaphysical necessity and possibility. Lowe's defence of serious essentialism is both metaphysical and epistemological. In what follows I use Lowe's discussion as a point of departure for, first, adding some considerations for the plausibility of essentialism and, second, some work on modal epistemology.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 62 , July 2008 , pp. 49 - 63
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2008

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References

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