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Base-rate respect: From statistical formats to cognitive structures

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 October 2007

Aron K. Barbey  and
Steven A. Sloman
Aron K. Barbey
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322, barbeya@nih.ninds.gov
Steven A. Sloman
Affiliation:
Cognitive and Linguistics Science, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912Steven_Sloman@brown.eduhttp://www.cog.brown.edu/~sloman/
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Abstract

The commentaries indicate a general agreement that one source of reduction of base-rate neglect involves making structural relations among relevant sets transparent. There is much less agreement, however, that this entails dual systems of reasoning. In this response, we make the case for our perspective on dual systems. We compare and contrast our view to the natural frequency hypothesis as formulated in the commentaries.

Type
Authors' Response
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , June 2007 , pp. 287 - 292
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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