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Dissociating body image and body schema with rubber hands

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 August 2007

Nicholas Paul Holmes  and
Charles Spence
Nicholas Paul Holmes
Affiliation:
Espace et Action, INSERM Unité 864, Bron 69676, Francenpholmes@neurobiography.infohttp://www.neurobiography.info
Charles Spence
Affiliation:
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 3UD, United Kingdom. charles.spence@psy.ox.ac.ukhttp://www.psy.ox.ac/xmodal
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Abstract

Dijkerman & de Haan (D&dH) argue that body image and body schema form parts of different and dissociable somatosensory streams. We agree in general, but believe that more emphasis should be placed on interactions between these two streams. We illustrate this point with evidence from the rubber-hand illusion (RHI) – an illusion of body image, which depends critically upon body schema.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 2 , April 2007 , pp. 211 - 212
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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