Admissible rules are shown to be conservatively preserved by the meet-combination of a wide class of logics. A basis is obtained for the resulting logic from bases given for the component logics, under mild conditions. A weak form of structural completeness is proved to be preserved by the combination. Decidability of the set of admissible rules is also shown to be preserved, with no penalty on the time complexity. Examples are provided for the meet-combination of intermediate and modal logics.

In this paper it is shown that the Verification Thesis (all truths are knowable) is only susceptible to Fitch’s Paradox if one conflates the de re and de dicto interpretation of knowability. A formalisation shows that if one treats knowability as a complex second-order predicate, then the paradox falls apart.

Peirce considered the principal business of logic to be the analysis of reasoning. He argued that the diagrammatic system of Existential Graphs, which he had invented in 1896, carries the logical analysis of reasoning to the furthest point possible. The present paper investigates the analytic virtues of the Alpha part of the system, which corresponds to the sentential calculus. We examine Peirce’s proposal that the relation of illation is the primitive relation of logic and defend the view that this idea constitutes the fundamental motive of philosophy of notation both in algebraic and graphical logic. We explain how in his algebras and graphs Peirce arrived at a unifying notation for logical constants that represent both truth-function and scope. Finally, we show that Shin’s argument for multiple readings of Alpha graphs is circular.

The book Das Interpretationsproblem der Formalisierten Zahlentheorie und ihre Formale Widerspruchsfreiheit by Erik Stenius published in 1952 contains a consistency proof for infinite ω-arithmetic based on a semantical interpretation. Despite the proof’s reference to semantics the truth definition is in fact equivalent to a syntactical derivability or reduction condition. Based on this reduction condition Stenius proves that the complexity of formulas in a derivation can be limited by the complexity of the conclusion. This independent result can also be proved by cut elimination for ω-arithmetic which was done by Schütte in 1951.

In this paper we interpret the syntactic reduction in Stenius’ work as a method for cut elimination based on invertibility of the logical rules. Through this interpretation the constructivity of Stenius’ proof becomes apparent. This improvement was explicitly requested from Stenius by Paul Bernays in private correspondence (In a letter from Bernays begun on the 19th of September 1952 (Stenius & Bernays, 1951–75)). Bernays, who took a deep interest in Stenius’ manuscript, applied the described method in a proof Herbrand’s theorem. In this paper we prove Herbrand’s theorem, as an application of Stenius’ work, based on lecture notes of Bernays (Bernays, 1961). The main result completely resolves Bernays’ suggestions for improvement by eliminating references to Stenius’ semantics and by showing the constructive nature of the proof. A comparison with Schütte’s cut elimination proof shows how Stenius’ simplification of the reduction of universal cut formulas, which in Schütte’s proof requires duplication and repositioning of the cuts, shifts the problematic case of reduction to implications.

In this paper I argue that negation in The Port Royal Logic is not a failed or incoherent approximation of Boolean complementation as maintained by Sylvain Auroux and Marc Dominicy, but is rather a version of privative negation from medieval logic, and that as such it has a perfectly coherent semantics. The discussion reviews the critiques of Auroux and Dominicy as well as the semantics of privative negation as found in Aristotle, Proclus, Ockham, Buridan, Descartes, and Arnauld.

Maddy gave a semi-formal account of restrictiveness by defining a formal notion based on a class of interpretations and explaining how to handle false positives and false negatives. Recently, Hamkins pointed out some structural issues with Maddy’s definition. We look at Maddy’s formal definitions from the point of view of an abstract interpretation relation. We consider various candidates for this interpretation relation, including one that is close to Maddy’s original notion, but fixes the issues raised by Hamkins. Our work brings to light additional structural issues that we also discuss.

Increases in the use of automated theorem-provers have renewed focus on the relationship between the informal proofs normally found in mathematical research and fully formalised derivations. Whereas some claim that any correct proof will be underwritten by a fully formal proof, sceptics demur. In this paper I look at the relevance of these issues for formalism, construed as an anti-platonistic metaphysical doctrine. I argue that there are strong reasons to doubt that all proofs are fully formalisable, if formal proofs are required to be finitary, but that, on a proper view of the way in which formal proofs idealise actual practice, this restriction is unjustified and formalism is not threatened.

We consider the consistency proof for a weak fragment of arithmetic published by von Neumann in 1927. This proof is rather neglected in the literature on the history of consistency proofs in the Hilbert school. We explain von Neumann’s proof and argue that it fills a gap between Hilbert’s consistency proofs for the so-called elementary calculus of free variables with a successor and a predecessor function and Ackermann’s consistency proof for second-order primitive recursive arithmetic. In particular, von Neumann’s proof is the first rigorous proof of the consistency of an axiomatization of the first-order theory of a successor function.

In this article, I consider the status of several statements analogous to the Church–Turing thesis that assert that some definition of algorithmic randomness captures the intuitive conception of randomness. I argue that we should not only reject the theses that have appeared in the algorithmic randomness literature, but more generally that we ought not evaluate the adequacy of a definition of randomness on the basis of whether it captures the so-called intuitive conception of randomness to begin with. Instead, I argue that a more promising alternative is to evaluate the adequacy of a definition of randomness on the basis of whether it captures what I refer to as a “notion of almost everywhere typicality.” In support of my main claims, I will appeal to recent work in showing the connection between of algorithmic randomness and certain “almost everywhere” theorems from classical mathematics.

The Generales Inquisitiones de Analysi Notionum et Veritatum is Leibniz’s most substantive work in the area of logic. Leibniz’s central aim in this treatise is to develop a symbolic calculus of terms that is capable of underwriting all valid modes of syllogistic and propositional reasoning. The present paper provides a systematic reconstruction of the calculus developed by Leibniz in the Generales Inquisitiones. We investigate the most significant logical features of this calculus and prove that it is both sound and complete with respect to a simple class of enriched Boolean algebras which we call auto-Boolean algebras. Moreover, we show that Leibniz’s calculus can reproduce all the laws of classical propositional logic, thus allowing Leibniz to achieve his goal of reducing propositional reasoning to algebraic reasoning about terms.

We construct four binary consequence systems axiomatizing entailment relations between formulas of classical, intuitionistic, dual-intuitionistic and modal (S4) logics, respectively. It is shown that the intuitionistic consequence system is embeddable in the modal (S4) one by the usual modal translation prefixing □ to every subformula of the translated formula. An analogous modal translation of dual-intuitionistic formulas then consists of prefixing ◊ to every subformula of the translated formula. The philosophical importance of this result is briefly discussed.

A deductive system for Lewis counterfactuals is presented, based directly on the influential generalisation of relational semantics through ternary similarity relations introduced by Lewis. This deductive system builds on a method of enriching the syntax of sequent calculus by labels for possible worlds. The resulting labelled sequent calculus is shown to be equivalent to the axiomatic system VC of Lewis. It is further shown to have the structural properties that are needed for an analytic proof system that supports root-first proof search. Completeness of the calculus is proved in a direct way, such that for any given sequent either a formal derivation or a countermodel is provided; it is also shown how finite countermodels for unprovable sequents can be extracted from failed proof search, by which the completeness proof turns into a proof of decidability.

In 1837, Dirichlet proved that there are infinitely many primes in any arithmetic progression in which the terms do not all share a common factor. Modern presentations of the proof are explicitly of higher-order, in that they involve quantifying over and summing over Dirichlet characters, which are certain types of functions. The notion of a character is only implicit in Dirichlet’s original proof, and the subsequent history shows a very gradual transition to the modern mode of presentation.

In this essay, we study the history of Dirichlet’s theorem with an eye towards understanding the methodological pressures that influenced some of the ontological shifts that occurred in nineteenth century mathematics. In particular, we use the history to understand some of the reasons that functions are treated as ordinary objects in contemporary mathematics, as well as some of the reasons one might want to resist such treatment.

A semantics for quantified modal logic is presented that is based on Kleene’s notion of realizability. This semantics generalizes Flagg’s 1985 construction of a model of a modal version of Church’s Thesis and first-order arithmetic. While the bulk of the paper is devoted to developing the details of the semantics, to illustrate the scope of this approach, we show that the construction produces (i) a model of a modal version of Church’s Thesis and a variant of a modal set theory due to Goodman and Scedrov, (ii) a model of a modal version of Troelstra’s generalized continuity principle together with a fragment of second-order arithmetic, and (iii) a model based on Scott’s graph model (for the untyped lambda calculus) which witnesses the failure of the stability of nonidentity.

Causal models defined in terms of structural equations have proved to be quite a powerful way of representing knowledge regarding causality. However, a number of authors have given examples that seem to show that the Halpern–Pearl (HP) definition of causality (Halpern & Pearl, 2005) gives intuitively unreasonable answers. Here it is shown that, for each of these examples, we can give two stories consistent with the description in the example, such that intuitions regarding causality are quite different for each story. By adding additional variables, we can disambiguate the stories. Moreover, in the resulting causal models, the HP definition of causality gives the intuitively correct answer. It is also shown that, by adding extra variables, a modification to the original HP definition made to deal with an example of Hopkins & Pearl (2003) may not be necessary. Given how much can be done by adding extra variables, there might be a concern that the notion of causality is somewhat unstable. Can adding extra variables in a “conservative” way (i.e., maintaining all the relations between the variables in the original model) cause the answer to the question “Is X = x a cause of Y = y?” to alternate between “yes” and “no”? It is shown that we can have such alternation infinitely often, but if we take normality into consideration, we cannot. Indeed, under appropriate normality assumptions. Adding an extra variable can change the answer from “yes’ to “no”, but after that, it cannot change back to “yes”.

We outline an intuitionistic view of knowledge which maintains the original Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov semantics for intuitionism and is consistent with the well-known approach that intuitionistic knowledge be regarded as the result of verification. We argue that on this view coreflection A → KA is valid and the factivity of knowledge holds in the form KA → ¬¬A ‘known propositions cannot be false’.

We show that the traditional form of factivity KA → A is a distinctly classical principle which, like tertium non datur A ∨ ¬A, does not hold intuitionistically, but, along with the whole of classical epistemic logic, is intuitionistically valid in its double negation form ¬¬(KA ¬ A).

Within the intuitionistic epistemic framework the knowability paradox is resolved in a constructive manner. We argue that this paradox is the result of an unwarranted classical reading of constructive principles and as such does not have the consequences for constructive foundations traditionally attributed it.

We define and study quasidialectical systems, which are an extension of Magari’s dialectical systems, designed to make Magari’s formalization of trial and error mathematics more adherent to the real mathematical practice of revision: our proposed extension follows, and in several regards makes more precise, varieties of empiricist positions à la Lakatos. We prove several properties of quasidialectical systems and of the sets that they represent, called quasidialectical sets. In particular, we prove that the quasidialectical sets are ${\rm{\Delta }}_2^0$ sets in the arithmetical hierarchy. We distinguish between “loopless” quasidialectal systems, and quasidialectical systems “with loops”. The latter ones represent exactly those coinfinite c.e. sets, that are not simple. In a subsequent paper we will show that whereas the dialectical sets are ω-c.e., the quasidialectical sets spread out throughout all classes of the Ershov hierarchy of the ${\rm{\Delta }}_2^0$ sets.

Say that two sentences are factually equivalent when they describe the same facts or situations, understood as worldly items, i.e. as bits of reality rather than as representations of reality. The notion of factual equivalence is certainly of central interest to philosophical semantics, but it plays a role in a much wider range of philosophical areas. What is the logic of factual equivalence? This paper attempts to give a partial answer to this question, by providing an answer the following, more specific question: Given a standard propositional language with negation, conjunction and disjunction as primitive operators, which sentences of the language should be taken to be factually equivalent by virtue of their logical form? The system for factual equivalence advocated in this paper is a proper fragment of the first-degree system for the logic of analytic equivalence put forward in the late seventies by R. B. Angell. I provide the system with two semantics, both formulated in terms of the notion of a situation’s being fittingly described by a linguistic item. In the final part of the paper I argue, contra a view I defended in my “Grounding and Truth-Functions” (2010), that the logic for factual equivalence I advocate here should be preferred to Angell’s logic if one wishes to follow the general conception of the relationships between factual equivalence and the notion of grounding put forward in the 2010 paper.

This paper is a continuation of Amidei, Pianigiani, San Mauro, Simi, & Sorbi (2016), where we have introduced the quasidialectical systems, which are abstract deductive systems designed to provide, in line with Lakatos’ views, a formalization of trial and error mathematics more adherent to the real mathematical practice of revision than Magari’s original dialectical systems. In this paper we prove that the two models of deductive systems (dialectical systems and quasidialectical systems) have in some sense the same information content, in that they represent two classes of sets (the dialectical sets and the quasidialectical sets, respectively), which have the same Turing degrees (namely, the computably enumerable Turing degrees), and the same enumeration degrees (namely, the ${\rm{\Pi }}_1^0$ enumeration degrees). Nonetheless, dialectical sets and quasidialectical sets do not coincide. Even restricting our attention to the so-called loopless quasidialectical sets, we show that the quasidialectical sets properly extend the dialectical sets. As both classes consist of ${\rm{\Delta }}_2^0$ sets, the extent to which the two classes differ is conveniently measured using the Ershov hierarchy: indeed, the dialectical sets are ω-computably enumerable (close inspection also shows that there are dialectical sets which do not lie in any finite level; and in every finite level n ≥ 2 of the Ershov hierarchy there is a dialectical set which does not lie in the previous level); on the other hand, the quasidialectical sets spread out throughout all classes of the hierarchy (close inspection shows that for every ordinal notation a of a nonzero computable ordinal, there is a quasidialectical set lying in ${\rm{\Sigma }}_a^{ - 1}$, but in none of the preceding levels).

We prove that any equational basis that defines representable relation algebras (RRA) over weakly representable relation algebras (wRRA) must contain infinitely many variables. The proof uses a construction of arbitrarily large finite weakly representable but not representable relation algebras whose “small” subalgebras are representable.